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SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING TO ANOTHER 
SENTENCING CRISIS: TAKING PROPORTIONALITY SERIOUSLY 
AND IMPLEMENTING FAIR FIXED PENALTIES 
MIRKO BAGARIC* AND SANDEEP GOPALAN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bad policy is often only evident following its implementation. The weight 
of consequences invariably trumps bad ideas. But in order for this to occur, 
influential voices need to expose the falsehoods and their rewards. The enmity 
that many people in the community have towards criminals explains why the 
intellectually and normatively barren United States sentencing policy has 
remained unchallenged for the past few decades.1 With only a hint of 
exaggeration, that policy comes down to one main approach: incarceration. 
This has resulted in the United States imprisoning more of its citizens than any 
other nation—and by an enormous margin.2 It is an international outlier in the 
imprisonment stakes. Paradoxically, it is also the nation from which the most 
studies showing the ineffectiveness of imprisonment emanate.3 Americans 
more so than any other people ought to know that incarceration is an 
essentially flawed sentencing objective and that locking up ever more people 
provides diminishing returns.4 As the 2015 report by the Brennan Center for 
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 1. The tough on crime strategy is often referred to as the “Southern Strategy,” which was 
effective in politicizing the law and order issues due to the parallel growth of a number of other 
movements, including those relating to victims’ rights and the women’s movement. In addition to 
this, the strategy was not heavily opposed because of the anxieties of “whites” about rising crime 
and concerns about diminishing economic opportunities. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
116 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, THE HAMILTON PROJECT: A NEW 
APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WHILE MAINTAINING LOW RATES OF CRIME 9 
(2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/01-reduce-incarceration 
-maintain-low-crime-raphaels-stollm/v5_thp_raphaelstoll-discpaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/KST7-
A726] (“The crime-reduction gains from higher incarceration rates depend critically on the 
incarceration rate itself. When the incarceration rate is low, marginal gains from increasing the 
incarceration rate are higher. This follows from the fact that when prisons are used sparingly, 
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Justice notes, “incarceration in the U.S. has reached a level where it no longer 
provides a meaningful crime reduction benefit.”5 
The considerable fiscal burden stemming from imprisoning over two 
million Americans is now weighing so heavily on the community that finally 
there is a groundswell of opposition to the phenomenon of ever-increasing 
prison numbers. This is backed up by research showing that crime can decrease 
alongside decreases in the numbers of those in jail.6 
We agree that prison numbers must be reduced. But it is important to 
achieve this goal on the basis of empirically and normatively sound policies, 
otherwise other serious problems may be created. The response to the prison 
crisis thus far provides no foundation for confidence that a durable and 
principled response is forthcoming. This Article redresses this concern. 
We make recommendations regarding how the United States can 
significantly lower its incarceration rate, while at the same time ensuring that 
community safety is not diminished. Moreover, we identify and recommend a 
consolidation and extension of the positive aspects of the current sentencing 
regime. 
 
incarceration is reserved for the highest-risk and most-serious offenders. By contrast, when the 
incarceration rate is high, the marginal crime-reduction gains from further increases tend to be 
lower, because the offender on the margin between incarceration and an alternative sanction tends 
to be less serious. In other words, the crime-fighting benefits of incarceration diminish with the 
scale of the prison population.”). 
 5. OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME 
DECLINE? 7 (2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/What_Caused_ 
The_Crime_Decline.pdf [http://perma.cc/GM6X-GB7W]. “The incarceration rate jumped by 
more than 60 percent from 1990 to 1999, while the rate of violent crime dropped by 28 percent. 
In the next decade, the rate of incarceration increased by just 1 percent, while the violent crime 
rate fell by 27 percent.” Id. The authors found that the decline in crime was attributable to 
“increased numbers of police officers, deploying data-driven policing techniques such as 
CompStat, changes in income, decreased alcohol consumption, and an aging population.” Id. at 
10. The report did not have state level data on abortions and could not make any original findings 
on that theory. However, the authors ventured “[b]ased on an analysis of the past findings, it is 
possible that some portion of the decline in 1990s could be attributed to the legalization of 
abortion. . . . Even if the abortion theory is valid, it is unlikely that an increase in abortions had 
much effect on a crime drop in the 2000s. The first cohort that would have been theoretically 
affected by abortion, 10 years after the 1990s, would be well beyond the most common crime 
committing ages in the 2000s.” Id. at 61. 
 6. The Brennan Center Report found: 
New York saw a 26 percent reduction in imprisonment and a 28 percent reduction in 
property crime. Imprisonment and crime both decreased by more than 15 percent in 
California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. These five states alone 
represent more than 30 percent of the U.S. population. In addition, eight states—
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Utah—lowered their imprisonment rates by 2 to 15 percent while 
experiencing more than a 15 percent decrease in crime. 
Id. at 27. 
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A distinguishing feature of the United States sentencing system is the 
heavy reliance on mandatory or presumptive penalties. Reliance on the grids in 
which these penalties are prescribed has contributed significantly to the 
incarceration crisis. It is not, however, adoption of grid sentencing per se that 
has caused the problem. Rather, it is the content of the grids that is 
misinformed. Grid sentencing is desirable. The key is correctly calibrating the 
content of the grid. We endorse the concept of standard penalties but suggest 
that they must be properly informed. The guiding determinant should be an old 
principle that has been glossed over in United States sentencing: 
proportionality.7 There is much confusion about what it means, and how it 
ought to be applied in sentencing policy and practice.8 This is a fundamental 
error. This Article argues that ensuring that the punishment fits the crime 
should be front and center of the sentencing regime. 
The outcome of this approach is that there will be a considerable lowering 
in the sanctions imposed on nearly all offenders, except those who have 
committed violent and sexual offenses. Property, fraud, immigration, and drug 
criminals will still incur the enmity of the community, but this venting will no 
longer result in the community punishing itself by paying billions of dollars to 
warehouse them for no demonstrable, tangible benefit. 
This Article proposes a new sentencing paradigm. The report by the United 
States National Academy of Sciences in 2014 into the failure of forty years of 
incarceration policy in the United States recommends that: 
[F]ederal and state policy makers should revise current criminal justice policies 
to significantly reduce the rate of incarceration in the United States. In 
particular, they should reexamine policies regarding mandatory prison 
sentences and long sentences. Policy makers should also take steps to improve 
the experience of incarcerated men and women and reduce unnecessary harm 
to their families and their communities.9 
 
 7. Thomas A. Balmer, Some Thoughts on Proportionality, 87 OR. L. REV. 783, 784 (2008) 
(“The idea that there should be some proportional relationship between a crime and the crime’s 
punishment dates back at least to the Code of Hammurabi and the Mosaic codes that appear in the 
Old Testament.”). 
 8. Id. at 804. Balmer writes that the Supreme Court’s inability to reach a majority in 
Harmelin 
[H]ighlights the difficulty of attempting to establish an objective test for determining 
proportionality. States with their own proportionality clauses, like Oregon, are able to 
avoid the threshold issue the Court has faced—whether the Eighth Amendment contains a 
proportionality component at all. But once this threshold is crossed, the search for 
standards of proportionality in the Eighth Amendment is equally difficult. 
Id. Further, “[o]nly time will tell whether litigants can propose or the courts can articulate tests 
for determining proportionality that are less subjective or that provide more analytical structure 
than the stark ‘shocks the moral sense’ standard . . . .” Id. at 817; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 
538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (“[O]ur precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity.”). 
 9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 9. 
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We inject content into this recommendation. While the main focus of this 
Article is theoretical in nature, we undertake the ambitious but necessary task 
of setting out in concrete terms a new sentencing paradigm. This system should 
replace the sentencing process in all parts of the United States, including the 
federal jurisdiction. In short, the core aspects of our proposal are that: 
1. There should be (only) twenty-two penalty levels;10 starting at zero to 
six months’ imprisonment with the next level increasing to six to 
twelve months. 
2. Each penalty level should then reflect an increase of twelve months. 
Thus, level twenty-one would equal twenty years’ imprisonment. The 
next and highest level should be life imprisonment. 
3. Each crime should have a standard penalty. This is determined by the 
extent to which the typical form of that crime sets back the flourishing 
of the typical victim. 
4. The aim is to match the extent to which the interests of the victim have 
been set back with the reduction in flourishing that is inflicted on the 
offender by the sanction. 
5. The only departures from the set penalty are seventeen aggravating and 
mitigating considerations (which are clearly defined) and which justify 
a predetermined deviation from the standard penalty in the order of ten 
percent to fifty percent. 
6. Prior convictions would be irrelevant to sentencing, except in the case 
of serious sexual and violent offenders, but even then they should carry 
far less weight in the sentencing calculus. 
7. The maximum penalty for any drug, migration, property, and fraud 
offenses should be ten years’ imprisonment. 
The above framework is a radical departure from the existing sentencing 
system. However, more radical is to maintain the current system or something 
approximating the existing regime. The current system based on the idea of 
mass incarceration is a failure: abjectly so.11 It makes victims of many 
criminals by inflicting disproportionate punishments on them, and victims of 
the communities by crippling them with burgeoning imprisonment costs. Our 
proposal will cease inflicting gratuitous pain on criminals, drastically reduce 
the prison budget, make the community no less safe, and enhance the 
transparency and consistency of the sentencing process. This Article fills a 
 
 10. This is approximately half the number in some fixed penalty regimes. See infra Part III. 
 11. See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 951 (2013) (“Much has been written about the long-term 
societal consequences of mass incarceration. These . . . include such phenomena as the promotion 
of racial stigma, poverty, absent parents, loss of economic mobility, distorted marriage markets 
for black women, detrimental effects on children, and increases in juvenile crime.”). 
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void not only in the literature regarding the adoption of a new sentencing 
paradigm, but even more importantly it remedies a serious pragmatic 
institutional shortcoming. As has been noted recently, the last twenty years 
have been a “period of drift” in the United States sentencing reform.12 During 
this period, no states have created new comprehensive sentencing systems.13 
In developing our proposal, we draw on some aspects of Australian 
sentencing law. There are many shortcomings associated with Australian 
sentencing;14 however, it has one considerable advantage over the regime in 
the United States—its emphasis on proportionality as being a cardinal 
consideration in determining penalty type and severity. In contrast, while there 
is some recognition of the proportionality principle in the United States, in 
reality it has fallen “into neglect.”15 
In Part II of the Article, we explain the magnitude of the incarceration 
burden. This is followed in Part III by an examination of the principal cause of 
the increased prison numbers and the contours of the United States sentencing 
system. Part IV analyses the principle of proportionality and establishes that it 
is the bedrock upon which the sentencing system should be grounded. In Part 
V of the Article, we discuss the reasons in favor of maintaining a fixed penalty 
system, albeit one that is fundamentally different to existing models. In the 
concluding remarks, we summarize our reform recommendations.16 
 
 12. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 73. 
 13. Id. at 74. 
 14. See infra Part V; see generally Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to 
Arbitrariness: The Need to Abolish the Stain That Is the Instinctive Synthesis, 38 U. N.S. WALES 
L.J. 76 (2015) [hereinafter Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness]. 
 15. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 86; see Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of 
Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009) (“In noncapital cases . . . the Court has done virtually 
nothing to ensure that the sentence is appropriate.”); Christopher J. DeClue, Comment, 
Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly Disproportionate Test Is Simply the 
Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in Disguise, 41 SW. L. REV. 533, 540–46, 572–79 
(2012); Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 
(2012) (noting that that Eighth Amendment proportionality principle was long viewed as dead); 
John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of 
Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 80 (2010) (“It is time . . . to pronounce the body of Eighth 
Amendment quantitative proportionality dead . . . .”); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right 
Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 681 (2005) (“[T]he body of law is messy and 
complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint . . . .”). 
 16. A caveat to this is that we do not consider the desirability of capital punishment. The 
United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan that still imposes the death penalty. 
The literature and analysis regarding the desirability of the death penalty is voluminous. It can 
only be examined in the context of a stand-alone dissertation focusing on this issue. This is not a 
meaningful limitation to this paper given that not all states impose the death penalty (there are 
thirty-one states that still have the death penalty). States With and Without the Death Penalty, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty 
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II.  THE INCARCERATION CRISIS 
As of 2013, more than two million Americans were in jail, which equates 
to over 900 per one hundred thousand adults.17 This rate has more than 
doubled over the past two decades18 and has been steadily rising much of the 
past forty years.19 In its recent report, the United States National Research 
Council notes: “Current incarceration rates are historically and comparatively 
unprecedented. The United States has the highest incarceration rates in the 
world, reaching extraordinary absolute levels in the most recent two 
decades.”20 By contrast, most developed countries have rates of imprisonment 
around five to ten times less than the United States.21 
The main drawback of imprisonment from the community perspective of 
imprisonment is its costs.22 While this has been rising gradually over the past 
few decades, it is only in recent years that the tipping point in terms of 
sustainability and affordability has been reached. The money spent on prisons 
is now so large that it has become evident that every dollar spent on prisons is 
a dollar lost for spending on activities, such as healthcare and education. In 
terms of expenditure, it costs taxpayers in the United States on average 
$31,286 in direct expenditures to house a prisoner for one year.23 The total 
 
[http://perma.cc/EE7H-RPNY] (last updated Sept. 23, 2015). Since 1976, there have been 1427 
executions. Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
executions-year [http://perma.cc/DRN2-XLJA] (last updated Feb. 3, 2016). Only a relatively 
small number of criminals are executed in the United States. Id. 
 17. The exact number of prisoners is 2,220,300, which equates to 910 per 100,000 adults. 
LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 2, 4 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cpus13.pdf [http://perma.cc/FHL7-VTYZ]. This number includes the approximately one-third 
of prisoners who are in local jails. Id. at 2. 
 18. Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1OeQ 
HFF [http://perma.cc/VL2S-9NUB]. 
 19. In fact, during this period it has quadrupled. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
1, at 1. 
 20. Id. at 68. 
 21. Id. at 2. 
 22. Of course, there is a high individual cost of imprisonment. As noted by the National 
Research Council of the National Academies, “incarceration imposes pain and loss on both those 
sentenced and, frequently, their families and others . . . .” Id. at 22. However, as a result of the 
enmity towards offenders, these have not proven to be persuasive reasons in favor of reform. See 
id. 
 23. According to a study by the Vera Institute of Justice, the average cost of a prisoner is 
$31,286 per year. See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 10 (2012), http://www.vera.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/3VQW-TYCB]. This is higher in some states and cities. In New York, the average cost is 
$60,076 per year. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING 175 
spending on prisons is now over fifty billion dollars annually.24 The scale of 
this, even for the world’s largest economy, is considerable. California now 
spends more on prisons than higher education.25 Spending on corrections ranks 
third, behind only Medicaid and education, in most state budgets: 
Budgetary allocations for corrections have outpaced budget increases for 
nearly all other key government services (often by wide margins), including 
education, transportation, and public assistance. Today, state spending on 
corrections is the third highest category of general fund expenditures in most 
states, ranked behind Medicaid and education. Corrections budgets have 
skyrocketed at a time when spending for other key social services and 
government programs has slowed or contracted.26 
It is now widely accepted that the United States has an incarceration crisis.27 
Vivien Stern, secretary general of Penal Reform International, states: “Among 
mainstream politicians and commentators in Western Europe, it is a truism that 
the criminal justice system of the United States is an inexplicable deformity.”28 
Similar sentiments are also expressed at home. The United States Attorney 
General Eric Holder said recently that “too many Americans go to too many 
prisons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason. It’s 
clear, at a basic level, that 20th-century criminal justice solutions are not 
 
 24. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., U. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. 
SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 18 (May 2012), http://www.usfca.edu/sites/de 
fault/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf [http://perma.cc/YAJ5-LT3S]. 
 25. Hansook Oh, California Budgets $1 Billion More to Prisons Than Higher Education and 
Leaves Students Hanging, SUNDIAL (Sept. 19, 2012), http://sundial.csun.edu/2012/09/california-
budgets-1-billion-more-to-prisons-than-higher-education-and-leaves-students-hanging/ [http://per 
ma.cc/M3EU-URET]. 
 26. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 314 (internal citation omitted). 
 27. It is widely accepted that the United States has a “serious over-punishment” and “mass 
incarceration” problem. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: 
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295–96 (2013); see, e.g., SASHA 
ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND VENGEANCE IN THE AGE OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT, at xiv–xv, xxiii (2007); Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & 
Austin Sarat eds., 2012); ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING 
COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 48–49 (2008); Todd R. Clear & James Austin, 
Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 307, 307 (2009); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 27–28 (2011); Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The Crisis and Criminal Justice, 
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 965–69, 983 (2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: 
Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 133 
(2011); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 423–25 
(2013). 
 28. Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 280 (Marc Mauer & Meda 
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
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adequate to overcome our 21st-century challenges.”29 In a later speech he 
stated: 
  Perhaps most troubling is the fact that this astonishing rise in 
incarceration—and the escalating costs it has imposed on our country, in terms 
both economic and human—have not measurably benefited our society. We 
can all be proud of the progress that’s been made at reducing the crime rate 
over the past two decades—thanks to the tireless work of prosecutors and the 
bravery of law enforcement officials across America. But statistics have 
shown—and all of us have seen—that high incarceration rates and longer-than-
necessary prison terms have not played a significant role in materially 
improving public safety, reducing crime, or strengthening communities. 
  In fact, the opposite is often true. Two weeks ago, the Washington Post 
reported that new analysis of crime data and incarceration rates—performed by 
the Pew Charitable Trusts, and covering the period of 1994 to 2012—shows 
that states with the most significant drops in crime also saw reductions in their 
prison populations. States that took drastic steps to reduce their prison 
populations—in many cases by percentages well into the double digits—saw 
crime go down as well. And the one state—West Virginia—with the greatest 
increase in its incarceration rate actually experienced an uptick in crime.30 
 
 29. Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html [http://perma.cc/KM63-4BAY]. He went on to note: 
While the entire U.S. population has increased by about a third since 1980, the federal 
prison population has grown at an astonishing rate—by almost 800 percent. . . . [F]ederal 
prisons are operating at nearly 40 percent above capacity. Even though this country 
comprises just 5 percent of the world’s population, we incarcerate almost a quarter of the 
world’s prisoners. More than 219,000 federal inmates are currently behind bars. Almost 
half of them are serving time for drug-related crimes, and many have substance use 
disorders. Nine to 10 million more people cycle through America’s local jails each 
year. And roughly 40 percent of former federal prisoners—and more than 60 percent of 
former state prisoners—are rearrested or have their supervision revoked within three years 
after their release . . . . 
Id. 
 30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, One Year After Launching Key Sentencing 
Reforms, Attorney General Holder Announces First Drop in Federal Prison Population in More 
Than Three Decades (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/one-year-after-launching-
key-setencing-reforms-attorney-general-holder-annouces-first-drop-0 [http://perma.cc/WQ2U-PH 
QT]. The Attorney General added: 
As the Post makes clear: “To the extent that there is any trend here, it’s actually that states 
incarcerating people have seen smaller decreases in crime.” And this has been borne out 
at the national level, as well. Since President Obama took office, both overall crime and 
overall incarceration have decreased by approximately 10 percent. This is the first time 
these two critical markers have declined together in more than 40 years. And although we 
have a great deal of work to do—and although, last year, some states continued to record 
growth in their prison populations—this is a signal achievement. We know that over-
incarceration crushes opportunity. We know it prevents people, and entire communities, 
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The perceived fallacy of mass incarceration has gone from being a mainstay of 
academic commentary to a common theme in the mainstream media. Rolling 
Stone magazine published a major report in October 2014, focusing on the 
injustice associated with long jail terms for drug offenders. The sentiment of 
the report is conveyed in the following passage: “Widely enacted in the 
Eighties and Nineties amid rising crime and racially coded political 
fearmongering, mandatory penalties—like minimum sentences triggered by 
drug weight, automatic sentencing enhancements, and three-strikes laws—have 
flooded state and federal prisons with nonviolent offenders.”31 The report adds: 
“For decades, lawyers, scholars, and judges have criticized mandatory drug 
sentencing as oppressive and ineffective. Yet tens of thousands of nonviolent 
offenders continue to languish behind bars.”32 A recent report in the New York 
Times notes that America now spends more on prisons than food stamps: 
  Few things are better at conveying what a nation really cares than how it 
spends its money. On that measure, Americans like to punish. The United 
States spent about $80 billion on its system of jails and prisons in 2010—about 
$260 for every resident of the nation. By contrast, its budget for food stamps 
was $227 a person. In 2012, 2.2 million Americans were in jail or prison, a 
larger share of the population than in any other country; and that is about five 
times the average for fellow industrialized nations in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. The nation’s unique strategy on 
crime underscores the distinct path followed by American social and economic 
institutions compared with the rest of the industrialized world.33 
Thus, there is now an increasing recognition that something needs to be done 
to reduce incarceration levels.34 And it is happening—slowly but not surely. In 
2010, 2011, and 2012, there was a drop in imprisonment numbers. But it was 
relatively small—approximately three percent.35 However, in 2013, prison 
 
from getting on the right track. And we’ve seen that—as more and more government 
leaders have gradually come to recognize—at a fundamental level, it challenges our 
commitment to the cause of justice. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 31. Andrea Jones, The Nation’s Shame: The Injustice of Mandatory Minimums, ROLLING 
STONE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-nations-shame-the-injus 
tice-of-mandatory-minimums-20141007 [http://perma.cc/9A9C-CN5P]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
2014, at B1. The State of Maryland spends ten times more on corrections than it does on 
education. ROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 34. 
 34. See U.S. Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive Year During 2012, BUREAU 
OF JUST. STAT. (July 25, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/p12acpr.cfm [http://perma. 
cc/TZ79-C676]. 
 35. Id. The decline only focused on prisoners completing terms of one year or more in prison 
and fell from a high of 1,615,487 prisoners in 2009 to 1,571,013 in 2012. Id. 
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numbers again started rising.36 The continuing high prison numbers has 
prompted the implementation of novel measures to reduce the prison 
population. In April 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to 
reduce the sentencing guideline level for most federal offenses of drug 
trafficking.37 These changes will apply retroactively, meaning that over 46,000 
prisoners are eligible to have their cases reviewed for a penalty reduction, 
which on average is likely to be reduced by two years and one month, resulting 
in a savings of approximately 80,000 prison bed years (one bed year is 
equivalent to a prisoner being in jail for one year).38 In November 2014, voters 
in California approved “California Proposition 47, Reduced Penalties for Some 
Crimes Initiative (2014),”39 which limited the operation of that state’s harsh 
mandatory penalty regime by reducing some nonviolent offenses from felonies 
to misdemeanors.40 
 
 36. There was an increase of 4300 prisoners in 2013 compared to 2012. While the federal 
prison population decreased for the first time since 1980, this was more than offset by an increase 
in the state prison population (the first increase since 2009). E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 1 (Sept. 2014). 
 37. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Reduce 
Drug Trafficking Sentences: Commission Sends Amendments to Congress Including Provisions 
to Implement the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.us 
sc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/pressreleases/20140410_ 
Press_Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/37C7-4JMG]. 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Unanimously 
Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences: Commission 
Authorizes Judges to Reduce Drug Sentences for Eligible Prisoners Beginning November 2015 If 
Congress Allows Guidelines Change to Stand (July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/X8V6-DG4X]. 
 39. In summary, the law: 
● Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for certain drug possession offenses. 
● Requires misdemeanor sentence instead of felony for the following crimes when 
amount involved is $950 or less: petty theft, receiving stolen property, and 
forging/writing bad checks. 
● Allows felony sentence for these offenses if person has previous conviction for crimes 
such as rape, murder, or child molestation or is registered sex offender. 
● Requires resentencing for persons serving felony sentences for these offenses unless 
court finds unreasonable public safety risk. 
● Applies savings to mental health and drug treatment programs, K–12 schools, and 
crime victims. 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 
34 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf [http://per 
ma.cc/9U7M-3K78]. 
 40. The law was passed with a majority of fifty-nine percent of voters in favor of it. Kristina 
Davis, Calif Cuts Penalties for Small Drug Crimes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 4, 2014), 
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Even members of the community are softening in their views about 
criminals. The results of a poll published in October 2014 show that seventy-
seven percent of Americans are in favor of abolishing mandatory minimum 
sentences for nonviolent drug offenses.41 The level of support for this proposal 
increased from seventy-one percent when the same question was polled in 
December 2013.42 
Prior to examining how to fix the incarceration problem, we first look at its 
causes. 
III.  WHERE IT WENT WRONG 
A. The Move to Harsh Fixed Penalties 
The National Research Council in its recent report examining the rapid 
escalation in the imprisonment rate43 notes that changes to sentencing systems 
throughout the United States over the past few decades were precipitated by 
periods of rising crime and a growing politicization of the problem. 
While each state of the United States and the federal jurisdiction has its 
own sentencing system,44 there is now some convergence among the respective 
regimes. In particular, several key commonalties and themes exist, which 
explain the rapid growth in the incarceration rate. 
In the 1980s, the United States Congress and most state legislatures 
enacted mandatory sentencing laws, which prescribed long prison terms for a 
large number of offenses.45 Mandatory minimum or presumptive penalties46 
now operate to varying degrees in all states.47 Prescribed penalties are typically 
set out in sentencing grids, which normally use criminal history scores48 and 
offense seriousness to calculate the appropriate penalty. 
 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2014/nov/04/prop-47-misdemeanor-law-vote-elec 
tion-drug/ [http://perma.cc/U9KY-W8UW]. 
 41. REASON-RUPE, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: OCTOBER 2014 TOPLINE RESULTS 4 (Oct. 9, 
2014), http://reason.com/assets/db/14128084586864.pdf [http://perma.cc/NMA2-Y4W2]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 44. Sentencing (and more generally the criminal law) in the United States is mainly the 
province of states. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000). 
 45. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3. 
 46. For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of fixed or standard 
penalties in this Article. 
 47. Mandatory minimums are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United States 
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing systems in the 
world). See DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 24, at 45–47 (noting that 137 of 168 surveyed 
countries had some form of minimum penalties but none were as wide-ranging or severe as in the 
United States). 
 48. This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior convictions. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 395 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2013), http://www.ussc. 
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It has been contended that none of these policies leading to the increase in 
fixed penalties emanated from a clear theoretical foundation but rather 
stemmed from “back-of-an-envelope calculations and collective intuitive 
judgments.”49 In a similar vein, Berman and Bibas state, “Over the last half-
century, sentencing has lurched from a lawless morass of hidden, unreviewable 
discretion to a sometimes rigid and cumbersome collection of rules.”50 They 
add that “[m]odern sentencing reforms have repudiated rehabilitation as a 
dominant goal of sentencing. Many structured sentencing laws, including many 
guideline sentencing systems and severe mandatory minimum sentences, are 
designed principally to deter, incapacitate, and punish offenders.”51 
The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty laws are found in the 
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines” or “Guidelines”).52 These Guidelines are important 
because of the large number of offenders sentenced under this system and the 
significant doctrinal influence they have exerted at the state level.53 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory in nature, 
following the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Booker.54 However, sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in 
approximately sixty percent of cases.55 The set penalties apply to most types of 
offenses, including drug, fraud, and immigration crime. A United States 
 
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-pdf/2013_Guidelines_Manual_ 
Full.pdf [http://perma.cc/T82Z-72YN]. 
 49. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for 
Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
PERSPECTIVES 91, 93 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010). For further criticism 
of the guidelines, see James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 176 (2010); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2005). 
 50. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006). 
 51. Id. at 48. 
 52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 394. 
 53. Berman & Bibas, supra note 50, at 40. There are more than 200,000 federal prisoners. 
CARSON, supra note 36, at 1. 
 54. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held 
that aspects of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial. Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 477 (2011); Irizarry v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 708, 708 (2008); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 239 (2008); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007). For a 
discussion about the impact of Booker, see Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The 
Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227 (2014). 
 55. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug 
Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010). 
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Sentencing Commission Report in 2011 noted that the number of offenses with 
set terms are increasing and the terms were increasing.56 
As noted above, in terms of establishing the appropriate sentence, apart 
from the offense severity, the other key variable that determines the sanction in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the prior history of the offender.57 In 
relation to most offenses, a criminal history can approximately double the 
presumptive sentence. For example, an offense at level fourteen58 in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines carries a presumptive penalty for a first 
offender of imprisonment for fifteen to twenty-one months, which increases to 
thirty-seven to forty-six months for an offender with thirteen or more criminal 
history points.59 For an offense at level thirty-six, a first offender has a 
presumptive penalty of 188 to 235 months, which increases to 324 to 405 
months for an offender with the highest criminal history score. Thus, a bad 
criminal history can add between 136 to 170 months (over fourteen years) to a 
jail term. 
Some of the harshest types of mandatory sentencing laws are the three-
strikes laws, which have been adopted in over twenty states.60 The California 
three-strikes laws61 are the most well known.62 Prior to these reforms, 
offenders convicted of any felony who had two or more relevant previous 
convictions were required to be sentenced to between twenty-five years to life 
imprisonment. The importance attributed to previous convictions was 
exemplified by the fact that the current offense did not have to be for a serious 
and violent felony––any felony would do. This meant that some offenders 
were sentenced to decades of imprisonment for relatively minor crimes. 
 
 56. Memorandum from the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Office of Research and Data & Office 
of Gen. Counsel to Chair Saris, Comm’rs & Judith Sheon 24 (May 20, 2011), http://www.ussc. 
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research/retroactivity-analyses/fair-sentencing-act/20110520_Crack_ 
Retroactivity_Analysis.pdf [http://perma.cc/77M3-LLV9]. 
 57. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1109, 1109 (2008) (highlighting the importance of a defendant’s criminal history in 
assessing his or her sentence). 
 58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 394. The offense 
levels range from one (least serious) to forty-three (most serious). Examples of level fourteen 
offenses are criminal sexual abuse of a ward, failure to register as a sex offender, and bribery (if 
the defendant is a public official). Id. at 62, 66, 128. 
 59. Id. at 395. The criminal history score ranges from zero to thirteen or more (worst 
offending record). Id. 
 60. See James Austin et al., The Impact of ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out’, 1 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y 131, 132 (1999); Kelly McMurry, ‘Three-Strikes’ Laws Proving More Show Than Go, 33 
TRIAL 12 (1997); Tonry, supra note 49, at 93. 
 61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2015). 
 62. The Supreme Court has held that California’s three-strikes laws do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 
11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
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Defendants have been sentenced to twenty-five years to life where their last 
offense was for a minor theft (which, prior to the three-strikes regime, would 
normally have resulted in a non-custodial sentence). For example, Jerry 
Dewayne Williams, a twenty-seven-year-old Californian, was ordered to be 
imprisoned for twenty-five years to life without parole, for stealing a slice of 
pepperoni pizza from a group of four youths, based on his previous 
convictions.63 Gary Ewing was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for 
shoplifting three golf clubs, each of which was worth $399.64 Prior to that, he 
had been convicted for four serious or violent felonies.65 
The California three-strikes laws were softened somewhat in 2012, such 
that a term of at least twenty-five years would only be required where the third 
offense was a serious or violent felony.66 In such cases, offenders continue to 
receive a significant premium––they must be sentenced to double the term they 
would have otherwise received for the instant offense.67 Thus, despite the 
softening of the laws, they still provide severe penalties for serious and violent 
offender third-strikers. As noted above, amendments in 2014 have further 
reduced the harshness of this regime. 
Perhaps the greatest indication of the harshness of United States sentencing 
is that life without parole is mandatory upon conviction for at least one 
specified offense in twenty-seven states.68 There are over 40,000 prisoners in 
the United States serving life without parole.69 This greatly exceeds the 
number of such prisoners in the rest of the world. In Australia, for example, 
there are only fifty-nine prisoners serving life without parole.70 
By any measure—even without the benefit of hindsight—most mandatory 
penalty regimes seem harsh. But it is not the case that the systems were 
 
 63. Phil Reeves, ‘Life’ for Pizza Theft Enrages Lawyers, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 3, 1995), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/life-for-pizza-theft-enrages-lawyers-1609876.html 
[http://perma.cc/Y5PQ-H6F9]. 
 64. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19. 
 65. Ewing appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of the 
legislation. Id. at 30–31. For a discussion of the case, see Sara Sun Beale, The Story of Ewing: 
Three Strikes Laws and the Limits of the Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review, in 
CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 427, 428 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013), http://scholar 
ship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2953&context=faculty_scholarship [http://perma. 
cc/DRD9-9M3S]. 
 66.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2015); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL 
ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 48 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ 
2012/general/pdf/complete-vig-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/SLQ9-VWQY]. 
 67. Id. at 50. 
 68. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences 
in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 28 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 31. 
 70. DE LA VEGA ET AL., supra note 24, at 25. Thus, per capita, the incidence of life without 
parole is fifty-one times higher in the United States than in Australia. 
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implemented without considerable deliberation and research—simply, as is 
discussed below, the research was lacking in one crucial area: matching the 
severity of the crime to the harshness of the penalty.71 
B. Fixed Penalty Regime Not Implemented in Ignorance of Main Rationales 
of Sentencing 
Strong arguments can be made in favor of the view that penalties 
prescribed in most mandatory or presumptive penalty regimes are excessive. 
However, this is not necessarily because of a fundamentally flawed approach 
to sentencing or ignorance of the main competing tensions and relevant issues. 
To the contrary, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are informed by a deep 
level of learning regarding the aims and objectives of sentencing. 
To this end, the United States Sentencing Commission expressly notes that 
the guidelines aim to “further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: 
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”72 Further, the 
Guidelines state that “[t]he [Sentencing Reform] Act’s basic objective was to 
enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an 
effective, fair sentencing system.”73 The Guidelines add that “[m]ost observers 
of the criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of 
punishment in particular, is the control of crime.”74 
Most astutely, the Sentencing Commission noted that “[a] philosophical 
problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the differing 
perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment.”75 However, there was no 
need to delve into this potential quagmire because “[a]s a practical matter, . . . 
in most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will produce 
the same or similar results.”76 
Proportionality is pursued in the Guidelines “through a system that 
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing 
severity.”77 Moreover, the sentencing ranges were not developed in abstract or 
against a purely theoretical model. They were influenced by an analysis of over 
40,000 sentences, which had been imposed.78 
 
 71. The move to higher penalties is the principal reason for the increase in prison numbers. 
However, it is not the sole cause. Another contributing factor was the “truth in sentencing laws,” 
which increased the actual time served by prisoners. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 
79–83, 102. 
 72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 1. 
 73. Id. at 2. 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2013), supra note 48, at 2–3. 
 78. Id. at 11 (“The Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial guidelines with 
considerable caution. It examined the many hundreds of criminal statutes in the United States 
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Thus, the Sentencing Commission was highly cognizant of the main 
challenges to sentencing. Despite this, the reforms failed for two key reasons. 
First, its recommendations were not sufficiently informed by the efficacy of 
sentencing to achieve the key orthodox objectives of sentencing in the form of 
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
Secondly, proportionality was pursued in theory only. We now expand on 
these observations. 
C. Empirical Data Regarding What Can Be Achieved in Sentencing 
In order for sentencing to best facilitate the needs of the community, it 
needs to be evidence based. It is futile to pursue objectives that are 
unattainable. This obvious truth has carried surprisingly little weight in the 
sentencing realm. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider at length the 
empirical findings, regarding the efficacy of punishment to achieve the 
objectives of incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.79 However, the 
trend of the findings is relatively consistent, and hence it is possible to provide 
an overview of the relevant conclusions. In short, current empirical evidence 
provides no basis for confidence that punishment is capable of achieving the 
goal of specific deterrence.80 General deterrence works only in the absolute 
sense,81 and the jury is still out on the capacity of the sentencing system to 
 
Code. It began with those that were the basis for a significant number of prosecutions and sought 
to place them in a rational order. It developed additional distinctions relevant to the application of 
these provisions and it applied sentencing ranges to each resulting category. In doing so, it relied 
on pre-guidelines sentencing practice as revealed by its own statistical analyses based on 
summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports, 
the parole guidelines, and policy judgments.”). 
 79. One of us (Bagaric) has recently considered these at length in individual papers on each 
of these objectives, and the discussion immediately below is a summary of the findings in these 
papers: Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to Shape the 
Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, Rehabilitation Might and the 
Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012) [hereinafter Bagaric, The Capacity of 
Criminal Sanctions]; Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation: An 
Argument for Limiting Imprisonment Only to Sex and Violent Offenders, 2 J. COMMONWEALTH 
CRIM. L. 95 (2012) [hereinafter Bagaric, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation]; Mirko Bagaric & 
Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn’t Work—and What It Means for 
Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269 (2011) [hereinafter Bagaric, (Marginal) General Deterrence]. 
 80. JOHN E. BERECOCHEA & DOROTHY R. JAMAN, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR., TIME SERVED IN 
PRISON AND PAROLE OUTCOME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY REPORT NUMBER 2 16 (1981). This 
was a study based on an experiment involving the early release of felons in California in 1970. 
The authors found that “[w]ithin the first year and second year following release to parole, the 
experimentals and controls did not differ on the likelihood of their being returned to prison . . . . 
And there were no statistically significant differences between the experimentals and controls 
among those who were not returned to prison.” Id. 
 81. See David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing 
Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 32, 32 (2012). Abrams conducted a study using 
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rehabilitate offenders. Incapacitation is effective to a minor degree, but it is 
only justified in relation to serious sexual and violent offenders. We now 
unpack these conclusions. 
The success of incapacitation cannot be measured solely by the height of 
the prison wall. Incapacitation is only effective if the offender would have 
reoffended during the term of the prison sentence. Further, incapacitation has 
an admittedly crude cost-benefit aspect. It is self-defeating to imprison 
offenders in order to prevent them from committing minor or trivial offenses, 
whose costs clearly exceed the damage from their crimes.82 
There are no established models for determining with a high degree of 
accuracy offenders who will reoffend.83 To the extent that sound predictions 
can be made about reoffending, this is in relation to relatively minor 
(especially property) offenses. However, the cost of imprisoning these 
offenders normally outweighs the seriousness of the offense.84 In addition, 
research has demonstrated that incarceration might have “criminogenic” 
effects.85 Lower level offenders interact with more serious criminals in prison 
and tend to commit graver crimes upon release. To be sure, there are complex 
reasons for this phenomenon, including socialization into a criminal culture, 
diminishment of lawful employment opportunities upon conviction, 
deterioration of relationships, and negative mental well-being.86 
 
add on gun laws passed by states enhancing sentences for offenders possessing firearms during 
the commission of the crime. He found that there was a decline in the number of gun robberies in 
the three years after the introduction of the laws. Id. 
 82. As noted in Part IV of this Article, this is not an accepted method for calibrating the cost 
of crime, and hence this criterion should only be relevant if the nature of the crime is manifestly 
minor. 
 83. Hence, the theory of selective incapacitation is flawed. See BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & 
PATRICK KEYZER, SEX OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 104, 104 (2009); Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders 
Justifiable?, 6 J. APPLIED SECURITY RES. 317, 323–24 (2011). See generally Bernadette 
McSherry & Patrick Keyzer, “Dangerous” People: An Overview, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: 
POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 3 (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011). 
Most recently it has been suggested that habitual criminals and serious offenders have a different 
brain anatomy compared to other people. Neuroimaging of the brain showed that such offenders 
have less brain activity in certain areas of the brain, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated with self-awareness, learning from 
past experiences, and emotions. See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE 
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF CRIME 373 (2013). 
 84. Bagaric, The Fallacy That Is Incapacitation, supra note 79, at 107. 
 85. Lynne M. Vieraitis et al., The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from 
State Panel Data, 1974–2002, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 589, 593 (2007). 
 86. CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., LIFE AFTER PRISON: 
TRACKING THE EXPERIENCES OF MALE PRISONERS RETURNING TO CHICAGO, CLEVELAND, AND 
HOUSTON 4–5 (May 2010), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/41 
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It is essentially for these two reasons that the benefits of incapacitation 
appear to have been minor. The United States National Academy of Sciences 
notes: “The increase in incarceration [in the United States over the past four 
decades] may have caused a decrease in crime, but the magnitude of the 
reduction is highly uncertain and the results of most studies suggest it was 
unlikely to have been large.”87 
A recent report by the Brennan Center based upon an analysis of state 
imprisonment data between 1980 and 2013 concluded that: 
Incarceration has been declining in effectiveness as a crime control tactic since 
before 1980. Since 2000, the effect on the crime rate of increasing 
incarceration . . . has been essentially zero. Increased incarceration accounted 
for approximately 6 percent of the reduction in property crime in the 1990s 
(this could vary statistically from 0 to 12 percent), and accounted for less than 
1 percent of the decline in property crime this century. Increased incarceration 
has had little effect on the drop in violent crime in the past 24 years. In fact, 
large states such as California, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas 
have all reduced their prison populations while crime has continued to fall.88 
The Brennan Center Report elaborates that the ineffectiveness of incarceration 
as a crime fighting tool might be owed to the fact that a large percentage of 
“the increase in incarceration was driven by the imprisonment of nonviolent 
and drug offenders. Today, half of state prisoners are serving time for 
nonviolent crimes. Almost half of federal prisoners are serving time for drug 
crimes. Further, two-thirds of jail inmates are merely awaiting trial.”89 
The Sentencing Project noted that “[w]hile incarceration is one factor 
affecting crime rates, its impact is more modest than many proponents suggest, 
and is increasingly subject to diminishing returns.”90 
While serious sexual and violent offenders do not reoffend at manifestly 
high rates, it transpires that individuals with previous convictions for serious 
offenses91 commit crime at a greater frequency than the rest of the criminal 
population. Further, offenders with prior convictions for serious sexual and 
violent offenses reoffend more frequently than first-time offenders.92 Thus, to 
 
2100-Life-after-Prison-Tracking-the-Experiences-of-Male-Prisoners-Returning-to-Chicago- 
Cleveland-and-Houston.PDF [http://perma.cc/P6V7-RN22]. 
 87. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 4. 
 88. ROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
 89. Id. at 25. 
 90. RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 8 (2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_iandc 
_complex.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD9Q-U54S]. 
 91. See infra Part VII (arguing serious offenses are confined to sexual and assault offenses). 
 92. See NSW SENTENCING COUNCIL, HIGH-RISK VIOLENT OFFENDERS: SENTENCING AND 
POST-CUSTODY MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 20–25 (May 2012). Beyond this, there is no basis for 
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the extent that incapacitation can be effective, there is some theoretical basis 
for imposing harsher penalties on recidivist serious offenders. To this end, it 
seems that while incapacitation does not justify additional prison time for 
minor offenders, it can support a recidivist loading in the order of twenty to 
fifty percent for serious sexual and violent offenders.93 
“Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing individual 
offenders for their transgressions, [and] thereby convincing them that crime 
does not pay.”94 Specific deterrence “attempts to dissuade offenders from re-
offending by inflicting an unpleasant experience on them (normally 
imprisonment) which they will seek to avoid in the future.”95 The available 
empirical data suggests that specific deterrence does not work. There is 
nothing to suggest that offenders who have been subjected to harsh punishment 
are less likely to reoffend than identically-placed offenders who are subjected 
to lesser forms of punishment. Thus, there is no basis for pursuing the goal of 
specific deterrence.96 
The weight of evidence suggests that rehabilitation fares only slightly 
better. Certain rehabilitative techniques have some degree of success for some 
offenders, but there is no data to show that there are wide-ranging techniques 
to reform all offenders.97 Rehabilitation should not drive sentencing outcomes 
 
more accurately predicting future serious offending. See MCSHERRY & KEYZER, supra note 83, at 
23–24; Black, supra note 83, at 317; McSherry & Keyzer, supra note 83, at 4–5. 
 93. See Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime—Not the Prior Convictions of 
the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous 
Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 408–11 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, The 
Punishment Should Fit the Crime] (arguing that this is consistent with the rate of reoffending of 
these offenders). 
 94. Bagaric, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 79, at 159; see also Daniel S. 
Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 124 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2009). 
 95. Bagaric, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions, supra note 79, at 159. 
 96. See Nagin et al., supra note 94, at 115, 120; Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using 
Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism 
Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357, 383 (2010); DONALD RITCHIE, SENTENCING 
ADVISORY COUNCIL, SENTENCING MATTERS: DOES IMPRISONMENT DETER? A REVIEW OF THE 
EVIDENCE 22 (Apr. 2011); DON WEATHERBURN ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 
THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECT OF CUSTODIAL PENALTIES ON JUVENILE REOFFENDING 2 
(2009); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973); NEW S. WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, SENTENCING: REPORT 139 
33 (July 2013). 
 97. See generally KAREN HESELTINE ET AL., AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, PRISON-
BASED CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER REHABILITATION PROGRAMS: THE 2009 NATIONAL PICTURE 
IN AUSTRALIA (2011), http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/5/6/4/%7b564B2ECA-4433-4E9B-
B4BA-29BD59071E81%7drpp112.pdf [http://perma.cc/37J2-B2EX]; Mark W. Lipsey & Francis 
T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 
ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 297 (2007); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 152. 
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unless and until it is demonstrated that the technique or program in question is 
likely to produce positive attitudinal and behavioral reform in the offender. 
The findings regarding general deterrence are also relatively settled.98 The 
existing data show that in the absence of the threat of any punishment for 
criminal conduct, the social fabric of society would readily dissipate; crime 
would escalate and overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of people to lead 
happy and fulfilled lives. Thus, general deterrence works in the absolute sense: 
there is a connection between the existence of some forms of criminal sanction 
and criminal conduct. However, there is insufficient evidence to support a 
direct correlation between higher penalties and a reduction in the crime rate.99 
The United States National Academy of Sciences notes: “The incremental 
deterrent effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at best. 
Because recidivism rates decline markedly with age, lengthy prison sentences, 
unless they specifically target very high-rate or extremely dangerous offenders, 
are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by incapacitation.”100 
It follows that “[m]arginal general deterrence [which is the theory that 
there is a direct] correlation between the severity of the sanction and the 
prevalence of an offense” should be disregarded as a sentencing objective, at 
least unless and until there is proof that it works.101 The fallacy that is marginal 
general deterrence is highlighted by the fact that criminologists believe that it 
does not work. For example, nearly ninety percent of criminologists believe 
that the death penalty does not deter murder.102 That is comparable to scientific 
consensus relating to the causes of global warming,103 yet legislatures and 
 
 98. See NIGEL WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SOCIETY 60–61 (1969); John K. 
Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of Oklahoma’s Return to 
Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 129 (1994); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto 
Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED 
ECON. 569 (2001); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of 
Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004); Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence 
Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2003); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain 
the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 178 (2004); Richard Berk, New Claims 
About Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 303, 303 (2005); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 68, 90. 
 99. Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing: Why 
Less Is More When It Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1202 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing]. 
 100.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 5. 
 101. See Bagaric, (Marginal) General Deterrence, supra note 79, at 270, 283. 
 102. Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The 
Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 501 (2009). 
 103. Brian Evans, A Clear Scientific Consensus That the Death Penalty Does NOT Deter, 
AMNESTY INT’L (June 18, 2009), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/a-clear-scientific-consensus-that-
the-death-penalty-does-not-deter/ [http://perma.cc/QR3S-5BEC]. 
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courts continue to fanatically use marginal general deterrence as a rationale for 
setting high penalties. This again highlights the disconnect in sentencing 
between fact and fiction. 
It follows that based on the existing empirical data, the goal of 
incapacitation should be pursued more sparingly, specific deterrence and 
marginal general deterrence should be abolished as sentencing objectives, and 
rehabilitation should not influence sentencing outcomes unless and until it is 
demonstrated that it is possible to reform offenders while at the same time 
imposing hardships on them.104 
The biggest mistake by the Sentencing Commission is the failure to apply 
the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality in its most 
basic, and persuasive, form requires that the seriousness of the crime be 
matched by the harshness of the penalty.105 A jurisdiction in which 
proportionality is prominent is Australia. A clear statement of the principle of 
proportionality is found in the Australian High Court case of Hoare v The 
Queen: “[A] basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of 
imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be 
justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered 
in light of its objective circumstances.”106 
In Veen (No 1) v [The Queen]107 and Veen (No 2) v [The Queen],108 the High 
Court of Australia stated that proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. 
It is considered so important that it cannot be trumped even by the goal of 
community protection, which at various times has also been declared as the 
most important aim of sentencing.109 
Thus, in the case of dangerous offenders, while community protection remains 
an important objective, at common law it cannot override the principle of 
proportionality. Proportionality has been given statutory recognition in all 
Australian jurisdictions.110 
 
 104. MIRKO BAGARIC, PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING: A RATIONAL APPROACH 128 (2001) 
(at the philosophical level, the act of state-imposed punishment is justified because, as noted 
above, absolute general deterrence theory is valid). 
 105. See Richard G. Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 
489, 492 (1994). 
 106. Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (Austl.). 
 107. Veen v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 458, 468 (Austl.). 
 108. Veen v The Queen [No. 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472 (Austl.). 
 109. Mirko Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing: The Need to Factor in Community 
Experience, Not Public Opinion, in POPULAR PUNISHMENT: ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF PUBLIC OPINION 78 (Jesper Ryberg & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, 
Proportionality in Sentencing]; see, e.g., Channon v The Queen (1978) 20 ALR 1, 7 (Austl.). 
 110. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a), 5(2)(c), 5(2)(d) (Austl.) (providing that one of the 
purposes of sentencing is to impose a just punishment, and that in sentencing an offender the 
court must have regard to the gravity of the offense, and the offender’s culpability and degree of 
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Proportionality is also a requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten states 
in the United States,111 and one of the few core sentencing principles that is 
adopted by both retributive and (some) utilitarian philosophers.112 As noted 
above, it is also a core principle that informs (though it does not direct) the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.113 
However, the reality is that proportionality exists in the abstract only: 
devoid of even the sparsest of detail. Its illusory nature and the unwillingness 
or incapacity of sentencing authorities to inject content into the principle, and 
to make it the lynchpin of determining sentence length and type is the 
fundamental reason for the unsatisfactory state of sentencing law and 
practice.114 
The United States Supreme Court first considered proportionality under the 
Eighth Amendment in the case of Weems.115 The Court noted: 
 
responsibility); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1) (Austl.) (stating that the sentence must be 
commensurate with the seriousness of the offense); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 
7(1)(a) (Austl.) (providing that the sentence must be just and appropriate); Sentencing Act 1995 
(NT) s 5(1)(a) (Austl.) (providing that the punishment imposed on the offender must be just in all 
the circumstances); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a) (Austl.) (stating that the 
punishment imposed on the offender must be “just in all the circumstances”); Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(j) (Austl.) (stating that the emphasis is upon ensuring that 
“the defendant is adequately punished for the offense”); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k) 
(Austl.) (providing that the need for a sentencing court to adequately punish the offender is also 
fundamental to the sentencing of offenders for Commonwealth matters); Crimes Sentencing 
Procedure Act 1999 (NSW) pt 1 s 3A(a) (Austl.) (stating that adequate punishment is 
fundamental to sentencing). 
 111. See Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 241, 250 (2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois, Oregon, Washington, 
and West Virginia). 
 112. See Jami L. Anderson, Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism, 16 CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS 13, 23 (1997); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 11–12 (1985) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, 
PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES]; JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A 
CRITICAL INVESTIGATION 5 (2004); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 165 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); Paul H. Robinson & 
Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832 
(2007); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as 
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1110 (2011). 
 113. See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 23. 
 114. Cf. John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038 
(2009) (“[O]wing to the ways in which people do and do not adapt to various hardships, our 
current methods of punishment may be too blunt to fashion proportional punishments.”). 
 115. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). The Court’s description of offender’s 
punishment: 
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a 
chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from 
friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no 
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  “[T]he earliest application of the provision in England was in 1689, the 
first year after the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1688, to avoid an excessive 
pecuniary fine imposed upon Lord Devonshire by the court of King’s Bench.” 
Lord Devonshire was fined thirty thousand pounds for an assault and battery 
upon Colonel Culpepper, and the House of Lords, in reviewing the case, took 
the opinion of the law Lords, and decided that the fine “was excessive and 
exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common right of the subject, and the law 
of the land.”116 
Justice McKenna, who wrote the opinion of the Court, was of the view that it is 
“a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to offense.”117 The Court held that the punishment violated the 
Eighth Amendment because of the excess of imprisonment and the 
“accessories.”118 The idea of proportionality as a component of the Eighth 
Amendment continued with California v. Robinson, where the Court explained 
that it “cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a 
cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”119 
 
participation even in the family council. These parts of his penalty endure for the term of 
imprisonment. From other parts, there is no intermission. His prison bars and chains are 
removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of 
his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice 
and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving 
notice to the “authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,” and without 
permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to 
retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to 
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as 
much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. 
Id. 
 116. Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983) 
(Justice Powell quoted from a House of Lords decision) (“‘[F]ine of thirty thousand pounds, 
imposed by the court of King’s Bench upon the earl of Devon was excessive and exorbitant, 
against magna charta, the common right of the subject, and the law of the land.’ Earl of Devon’s 
Case, 11 State Tr. 133, 136 (1689).”). 
 117. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367 (“Is this also a precept of the fundamental law? We say 
fundamental law, for the provision of the Philippine bill of rights, prohibiting the infliction of 
cruel and unusual punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the United States and must 
have the same meaning.”). 
 118. Id. at 358, 377; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 992–93 (1991) (Justice Scalia’s 
explanation of Weems) (“If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, however, it is hard to view 
Weems as announcing a constitutional requirement of proportionality, given that it did not 
produce a decision implementing such a requirement, either here or in the lower federal courts, 
for six decades. . . . Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals were equally devoid of evidence 
that this Court had announced a general proportionality principle. Some evaluated ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’ claims without reference to Weems. . . . Not until more than half a century 
after Weems did the Circuit Courts begin performing proportionality analysis.”). 
 119. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
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The Eight Amendment’s proportionality principle was elaborated in Solem 
v. Helm.120 In that case, the offender had been punished with imprisonment for 
life without parole for the crime of uttering a no-account check.121 The actual 
sentence for the crime was five years imprisonment and a fine of $5000, but, 
based on South Dakota’s recidivist statute, Helm’s punishment was ratcheted 
up to the level described above.122 Justice Powell writing the majority opinion 
noted that “[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the 
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence. 
In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were devoted to the rule that 
‘amercements’ may not be excessive.”123 He rejected the State's contention that 
proportionality does not apply to imprisonment pointing out that: 
The constitutional language itself suggests no exception for imprisonment. We 
have recognized that the Eighth Amendment imposes “parallel limitations” on 
bail, fines, and other punishments. . . . It would be anomalous indeed if the 
lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were both 
subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of 
imprisonment were not. There is also no historical support for such an 
exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth 
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.124 
The Court went on to hold: 
[C]ourt's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be 
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.125 
According to Justice Powell, the first element could be evaluated using 
“widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes,” the fact that 
 
 120. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285. 
 121. Id. at 281–82. 
 122. Id. at 281. 
 123. Id. at 284. 
 124. Id. at 288–89. 
 125. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292; see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989–90 (1991). Justice 
Scalia concedes that the third element could be applied with “clarity and ease” but dismisses it as 
irrelevant: 
That a State is entitled to treat with stern disapproval an act that other States punish with 
the mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from the undoubted fact that a State may 
criminalize an act that other States do not criminalize at all. Indeed, a State may 
criminalize an act that other States choose to reward—punishing, for example, the killing 
of endangered wild animals for which other States are offering a bounty. What greater 
disproportion could there be than that? “Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity 
inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of 
treating particular offenders more severely than any other State.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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“nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the 
threat of violence,” and by reference to “accepted principles” utilized by courts 
to assess the “harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.”126 “The 
absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant,” recognizing that the “lesser 
included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater 
offense,” that “attempts are less serious than completed crimes,” and that “an 
accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than the 
principal.”127 The Court accepted that in order to apply its test, a court would 
have to compare prison terms: 
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, 
but one of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally is more 
severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to decide 
that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. 
Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area.128 
Applying its objective criteria, the Court found that the punishment imposed 
on Helm violated the Eighth Amendment.129 
 
 126. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292–93; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988. This first element was 
severely attacked by Justice Scalia in Harmelin: 
[W]hether it is a “grave” offense merely to possess a significant quantity of drugs—
thereby facilitating distribution, subjecting the holder to the temptation of distribution, 
and raising the possibility of theft by others who might distribute—depends entirely upon 
how odious and socially threatening one believes drug use to be. Would it be “grossly 
excessive” to provide life imprisonment for “mere possession” of a certain quantity of 
heavy weaponry? If not, then the only issue is whether the possible dissemination of drugs 
can be as “grave” as the possible dissemination of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no? 
The members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we, know the situation on the streets 
of Detroit. 
Id. 
 127. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293. 
 128. Id. at 294; see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988–89. Justice Scalia undermined this reasoning: 
One cannot compare the sentences imposed by the jurisdiction for “similarly grave” 
offenses if there is no objective standard of gravity. Judges will be comparing what they 
consider comparable. Or, to put the same point differently: When it happens that two 
offenses judicially determined to be “similarly grave” receive significantly dissimilar 
penalties, what follows is not that the harsher penalty is unconstitutional, but merely that 
the legislature does not share the judges’ view that the offenses are similarly grave. 
Moreover, even if “similarly grave” crimes could be identified, the penalties for them 
would not necessarily be comparable, since there are many other justifications for a 
difference. For example, since deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the 
penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to 
detect may warrant substantially higher penalties. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 129. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. The Court wrote: 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm’s sentence to determine if it is 
proportionate to his crime. Applying objective criteria, we find that Helm has received the 
penultimate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more 
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Matters got interesting in Harmelin v. Michigan, where Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court was scathing about the reasoning in Solem.130 Engaging 
in an extensive historical analysis, he wrote: 
[W]e think it most unlikely that the English Cruell and Unusuall Punishments 
Clause was meant to forbid “disproportionate” punishments. There is even less 
likelihood that proportionality of punishment was one of the traditional “rights 
and privileges of Englishmen” apart from the Declaration of Rights, which 
happened to be included in the Eighth Amendment.131 
For Scalia, “to use the phrase ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ to describe a 
requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and 
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying more 
directly.” He relied upon the fact that proportionality was not unknown to 
Americans of the time, and the drafters had chosen not to incorporate the 
requirement specifically although they could have done so.132 In his view, the 
proscription was about the modes of punishment and not disproportionality.133 
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, finding that the 
Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”134 
According to the justice, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme 
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” He opined that a 
court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be guided 
 
harshly than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious crimes. He has 
been treated more harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the 
possible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence is significantly 
disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. 
 130. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965. 
 131. Id. at 974. 
 132. Id. at 977. (“In 1778, for example, the Virginia Legislature narrowly rejected a 
comprehensive ‘Bill for Proportioning Punishments’ introduced by Thomas Jefferson. 
Proportionality provisions had been included in several State Constitutions. There is little doubt 
that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of Rights were aware of such provisions, 
yet chose not to replicate them.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 133. Id. at 979. Justice Scalia wrote: 
While there are relatively clear historical guidelines and accepted practices that enable 
judges to determine which modes of punishment are “cruel and unusual,” proportionality 
does not lend itself to such analysis. Neither Congress nor any state legislature has ever 
set out with the objective of crafting a penalty that is “disproportionate”; yet as some of 
the examples mentioned above indicate, many enacted dispositions seem to be so—
because they were made for other times or other places, with different social attitudes, 
different criminal epidemics, different public fears, and different prevailing theories of 
penology. This is not to say that there are no absolutes; one can imagine extreme 
examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept. 
Id. 985 (emphasis in original). 
 134. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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by objective criteria, including the gravity of the offense and the harshness of 
the penalty;135 the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions.136 
This confusing state of affairs received fresh attention in Ewing v. 
California, where the Court affirmed the Harmelin test and reiterated the 
narrow proportionality principle contained in the Eighth Amendment.137 
Justice O’Connor elaborated on the application of the test to the facts: 
  In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales 
not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any 
other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments 
that find expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions. In imposing a three 
strikes sentence, the State’s interest is not merely punishing the offense of 
conviction, or the “triggering” offense: “[I]t is in addition the interest . . . in 
dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have 
shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as 
established by its criminal law.” To give full effect to the State’s choice of this 
legitimate penological goal, our proportionality review of Ewing’s sentence 
must take that goal into account.138 
The Court noted that “Ewing’s is not ‘the rare case in which a threshold 
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an 
inference of gross disproportionality,’” and held that a sentence of twenty-five 
years for stealing three golf clubs was not grossly disproportionate.139 
 
 135. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000–01, 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (For Justice Kennedy, 
“intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a 
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of 
gross disproportionality”). 
 136. Id. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy wrote: 
Although Solem considered these comparative factors after analyzing “the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty,” it did not announce a rigid three-part test. In 
fact, Solem stated that in determining unconstitutional disproportionality, “no one factor 
will be dispositive in a given case.” . . . Solem is best understood as holding that 
comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions is not always relevant to 
proportionality review. The Court stated that “it may be helpful to compare sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction,” and that “courts may find it useful to 
compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 
It did not mandate such inquiries. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 137. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 11–12, 20 (2003). 
 138. Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). This was a case under California’s three-strikes law. 
Ewing, a parolee, stole three golf clubs worth about $400 each and was sentenced to twenty-five 
years to life under the law. Id. at 11. 
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Justice Scalia was unimpressed and his dissent was scathing: 
  Proportionality . . . is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of 
retribution. “[I]t becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of 
‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant 
weight,” not to mention giving weight to the purpose of California’s three 
strikes law: incapacitation. In the present case, the game is up once the 
plurality has acknowledged that “the Constitution does not mandate adoption 
of any one penological theory,” and that a “sentence can have a variety of 
justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or 
rehabilitation.”140 
He went on to destroy the plurality’s reasoning: 
Having completed [the first step of its test] (by a discussion which, in all 
fairness, does not convincingly establish that 25-years-to-life is a 
“proportionate” punishment for stealing three golf clubs), the plurality must 
then add an analysis to show that “Ewing’s sentence is justified by the State’s 
public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons.”141 
Justice Scalia correctly pointed out that under the plurality’s explanation, the 
Court is not actually undertaking a proportionality analysis but reading in a 
requirement that “all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple 
purposes of the criminal law.”142 The majority’s inability to sustain its holding 
that twenty-five years’ imprisonment is a proportionate punishment for stealing 
three golf clubs on any intelligible logic illustrates the current state of judicial 
understanding of the concept. 
In many respects, this case illustrates the problem with the test: it has 
essentially collapsed into just the first limb.143 Courts rarely find that there is 
disproportionality between the gravity of the crime and the harshness of the 
punishment, meaning that there is no need to examine sentences imposed on 
other criminals or compare against sentences in other jurisdictions.144 
 
 140. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 141. Id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting “why that has anything to do with the 
principle of proportionality is a mystery”). 
 142. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 143. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In light of 
the gravity of petitioner’s offense, a comparison of his crime with his sentence does not give rise 
to an inference of gross disproportionality, and comparative analysis of his sentence with others 
in Michigan and across the Nation need not be performed.”). Justice Kennedy wrote that 
“[p]ossession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent ‘one of the greatest problems 
affecting the health and welfare of our population.’ Petitioner’s suggestion that his crime was 
nonviolent and victimless is false to the point of absurdity. To the contrary, petitioner’s crime 
threatened to cause grave harm to society.” Id. at 1002 (internal citations omitted). 
 144. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 88 (2010) (in evaluating this limb, the “analysis can 
consider a particular offender’s mental state and motive in committing the crime, the actual harm 
caused to his victim or to society by his conduct, and any prior criminal history.” Other factors 
are “past criminal conduct, alcoholism, and propensity for violence of the particular defendant” as 
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[T]he main elements of [the principle] are so indeterminate that they are 
incapable of providing meaningful guidance to sentencing courts [or 
legislatures]. There are no established criteria by which the severity of an 
offence is evaluated. It is accepted that the pain suffered by the victim of the 
crime is an important consideration. However, there is no existing 
methodology for measuring victim suffering. [The principle] is further clouded 
by the uncertainty regarding whether other variables, such as the offender’s 
prior criminal history, should be incorporated into the principle. The 
uncertainty of the principle is also compounded by the fact that there is no 
common standard which can be used to match sanction hardship with offence 
gravity.145 
The vagaries are so pronounced that it is verging on doctrinal and intellectual 
fiction to suggest that an objective answer can be given to common sentencing 
dilemmas, such as how many years imprisonment is equivalent to the pain felt 
by an assault victim; or whether a burglar should be dealt with by way of 
imprisonment or fine; or the appropriate sanction for a drug trafficker. 
Certainly, there is no demonstrable violation of proportionality if a mugger, 
robber, or drug trafficker is sentenced to either twelve months’ or twelve years’ 
imprisonment. The fact that the principle can be so flexible leads to the 
suspicion that it is no principle at all and is simply an expedient that is invoked 
by courts (and legislatures) as a means to justify their intuitive sentencing 
impulse. 
One commentator writes: 
  A number of state courts have examined factors similar to those that the 
U.S. Supreme Court identified in Solem—the gravity of the offense and 
severity of the punishment; the sentences imposed for other crimes in the same 
jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions. Two states—Illinois and California—now appear to have 
abandoned the second Solem factor and no longer attempt to compare 
sentences imposed for unrelated crimes as part of deciding proportionality 
challenges.146 
We now explore the principle in greater detail and suggest how it can be 
developed into a coherent and concrete concept. 
 
well as “specific details of the particular crime of conviction”); United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d 
1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e are certain that we cannot conclude that the sentence is 
grossly disproportionate when the defendant had twice before been convicted of a serious violent 
felony.”). 
 145. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 79–80. 
 146. Balmer, supra note 7, at 811. 
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IV.  DEVELOPING CONTENT INTO PROPORTIONALITY AS A BASIS FOR FAIR AND 
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING 
The key aspect of the principle is that [proportionality] has two limbs. The first 
is the seriousness of the crime, and the second is the harshness of the sanction. 
Further, the principle has a quantitative component—the two limbs must be 
matched. For the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be 
equal to the harshness of the penalty.147 
Before analyzing these two components in greater detail, we briefly discuss 
two forms of proportionality that have been advanced.148 
A. Cardinal and Ordinal Proportionality 
It has been suggested that there are two forms of proportionality. “The first 
is ordinal proportionality, which concerns how offenders are punished relative 
to each other. It focuses on the relative seriousness of offenses and comes 
down to the view that offenders who commit graver offenses should receive 
sterner penalties.”149 More fully, von Hirsch states that it has three features: 
parity, which requires that similar crimes deserve similar penalties;150 ranking 
order, which means that more severe crimes are accorded more severe 
sanctions; and the last requirement concerns spacing of penalties and provides 
that the space between the seriousness of penalties should be commensurate 
with the difference in the seriousness of the offense.151 
In order for the scaling to commence, a starting point is needed. This is 
determined by selecting a particular crime or crimes152 (benchmark crimes) 
and setting an appropriate sanction. Sanctions are then selected for all other 
crimes by comparing their seriousness with the benchmark crime and adjusting 
the penalty up or down accordingly. This process of anchoring the penalty 
scale is termed “cardinal proportionality.” 
Von Hirsch believes that cardinal proportionality is not absolute; it is a 
convention.153 It too is essentially a relative concept; however, at the extremes 
there is a limit to the level of punishment, which can be imposed. “If suitable 
 
 147. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 77–78. 
 148. The examination of the proportionality principle below is derived from Mirko Bagaric, 
Injecting Content Into the Mirage That Is Proportionality in Sentencing, 25 N.Z. U. L. REV. 411, 
424 (2013). 
 149. Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed 
Penalties, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, ¶ 72 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 150. Except in the case of relevant prior convictions. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND 
SANCTIONS 60 (1993) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS]. 
 151. He concedes that this is a matter upon which there is unlikely to be much exactness. VON 
HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 112, at 45. 
 152. Id. at 43. There is no specific crime, which should obviously be the starting point. 
 153. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 
112, 129 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994). 
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reasons can be established for objecting to [a] convention (for example, on 
grounds that it depreciates the importance of the rights of those convicted of 
. . . low-ranking crimes[]) . . . a non-relative constraint is established.”154 This 
serves to anchor the penalty scale. In earlier writings, von Hirsch states that 
cardinal proportionality may be breached where the sanction “fails to accord 
respect to the person punished,”155 or where it “denigrates the importance of 
the defendant’s right to liberty.”156 
This anchoring point, however, is not absolute in the true sense. It is only 
absolute within the legal system under consideration since different 
jurisdictions have different starting points, which are generally determined 
without considered reflection, but are merely accepted as being intuitively 
correct.157 This is a point accepted by von Hirsch (and Ashworth) in his more 
recent writings.158 
The distinction between ordinal and cardinal proportionality must be 
treated with some caution. While it is not illusory, it does not provide a 
meaningful distinction in terms of giving substance to the proportionality 
principle. All the hard work remains to be done.159 The starting point is that the 
gravity of an offense depends on its seriousness, where seriousness is gauged 
on the basis of certain (albeit yet to be determined) criteria. Application of this 
standard to each offense will determine the seriousness of the offense. 
Logically, this task can be undertaken without one eye being kept on how other 
offenses have been graded in the same way that one grades mathematics 
papers: two times two is four, irrespective of what the other papers say. 
Ordinal proportionality is no more than an appeal to internal consistency, 
which requires that the graver offenses are not treated less seriously than the 
comparatively more minor offenses. Thus, for example, murder must be treated 
 
 154. Id.; see also VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS, supra note 150, at 45 (making 
essentially the same point). 
 155. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 112, at 44 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 70 (4th ed. 2005) 
(noting that differing demographics and differing availability of “stealable” goods might cause 
differing crime rates and sentencing in different areas). 
 158. ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: 
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 143 (2005) [hereinafter VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, 
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING] (“How much guidance will our model give? Admittedly, it would 
provide only a limited degree of guidance on the setting of the penalty system’s anchoring 
points—that is, the system’s overall degree of punitiveness. But the model tells one considerably 
more (albeit not providing unique solutions) about the comparative scaling of penalties: about 
punishing equally reprehensible conduct approximately equally, and about scaling unequally 
serious conduct according to the conduct’s differing degree of seriousness.”). 
 159. In particular, the assertion that ordinal proportionality is all that is necessary is unsound. 
As noted by Jesper Ryberg, it logically permits for harsh punishments for minor offenses and soft 
punishments for serious offenses. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 148. 
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more harshly than robbery, which in turn must be punished more severely than 
theft. However, this appeal to consistency is not a defining characteristic of 
proportionality. It is merely an incidental feature that will follow if the 
seriousness of each offense is ranked properly according to the same indicia—
to avoid circularity, one of the criteria for determining offense severity cannot 
include existing penalties. 
Beyond this, ordinal proportionality may be used to act as a check on the 
outcome of applying the relevant indicia to each offense. If the result of such 
an analysis reveals disturbing rankings, for example, if it transpired that theft 
was more serious than murder, this breach of ordinal proportionality would 
suggest that the factors supposedly governing cardinal proportionality are 
incorrect or wrongly applied. However, this is not to set ordinal proportionality 
as a discrete, defining requirement of proportionality. It is merely to recognize 
it is a by-product of a correct application of the appropriate variables relevant 
to cardinal proportionality and a tool that may be used to loosely check 
estimates of cardinal proportionality. 
The most controversial aspect of von Hirsch’s analysis of cardinal 
proportionality is his claim that it is a relative concept. Although, the 
importance of certain interests vary across (and sometimes within) cultures, it 
may yet be possible to identify a sufficiently pervasive human concern or 
interest, which is sensitive to such variations, and, in this way, an objective 
formula for offense seriousness may be determined. This idea is developed 
below. 
As we adverted to earlier, the enthusiasm for the principle of 
proportionality is not matched by its clarity. The key concept for 
proportionality is the objective seriousness of the offense; however, this 
concept is so vague that it dilutes the principle to practical nothingness. In 
order for proportionality to be of pragmatic guidance, it is necessary to give 
some content to the factors that are relevant to the gravity of the offense. After 
this, the commensurability between the offense and sanction is examined. 
B. Factors Relevant to the Seriousness of the Offense 
The most obscure and unsatisfactory aspect of proportionality is that there 
is no stable and clear manner in which the punishment can be matched to the 
crime.160 As noted by Jesper Ryberg, one of the key criticisms of the theory is 
that it “presupposes something which is not there, namely, some objective 
measure of appropriateness between crime and punishment.”161 As he further 
 
 160. As noted in Part II of this Article, the courts have not attempted to exhaustively define 
the factors that are relevant to proportionality. See supra Part II. 
 161. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 184. 
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notes, to give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank crimes, rank 
punishments, and anchor the scales.162 
“This is a challenge noted by numerous scholars.”163 In relation to the first 
limb (at least), however, it has been noted that some approaches have been 
applied.164 Yet in a pragmatic sense, the problem is not insurmountable.165 
Legislatures commonly set maximum penalties for offenses, and this is a crude 
method for ranking offense seriousness.166 “While the maximum penalty is not 
a defining criterion regarding the sanction in any particular case, even when it 
comes to precisely prescribing a predetermined sanction for an offense type, 
this has often been undertaken with little difficulty.”167 
However, the fact that agreement can and has been reached regarding the 
seriousness of certain crimes (whether by government institutions or within the 
general community)168 does not justify the outcome.169 A doctrinally sound 
approach is needed to define the criteria by which offense severity is defined. 
It is to this that we now turn.170 
 
 162. Id. at 185. 
 163. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 84. 
 164. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 143 
(“How is crime-seriousness to be assessed? Ordinary people, various opinion surveys have 
suggested, seem capable of reaching a degree of agreement on the comparative seriousness of 
criminal offences.”). Moreover, there seems to be a relatively high degree of consensus in relation 
to this. For an overview of Robinson’s approach, see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, 
Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); Paul H. 
Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089 (2011) [hereinafter Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment 
Theory]. But for a counter to this, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, 
Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77 (2013). 
 165. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 84. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.; see VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 
143–44 (“The rulemaking bodies that have tried to rank crimes in gravity have not run into 
insuperable practical difficulties, moreover. Several US state sentencing commissions (including 
those of Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon) were able to rank the seriousness of offenses for 
use in their numerical guidelines. While the grading task proved time-consuming, it did not 
generate much dissension within these rule-making bodies.”). 
 168. Courts sometimes factor community sentiment into an assessment of offense severity. 
E.g., WCB v R [2010] VSCA 230 (Austl.); Stalio v The Queen [2012] VSCA 120 (Austl.). 
 169. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 60. (“Even if it is correct that there is general agreement 
between people as to how the seriousness of different crimes should be rated, this does not of 
itself show that the rating should be morally accepted. This would require an independent 
argument. Moreover, it is generally agreed that there might be a divergence between popular 
judgements and what is morally well-grounded. The need for a theoretical enquiry clarifying what 
is morally relevant in the comparison of crimes is, therefore generally acknowledged among 
proportionalists.”). 
 170. The approach below is similar in approach to the notion of “empirical desert” advanced 
by Robinson, but we adapt different criteria for informing the content of the principle. For an 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
202 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:169 
1. The Living Standard Approach 
  One of the most comprehensive examinations of the factors relevant to 
proportionality has been undertaken in the context of the “living standard” 
approach to proportionality. This was first advanced by Andrew von Hirsch 
and Nils Jareborg and refined more than a decade later by von Hirsch and 
Andrew Ashworth. [Andrew] von Hirsch and [Nils] Jareborg start with the 
assumption that the seriousness of a crime has two dimensions: harm and 
culpability. Harm refers to the injury done or risked by the act; culpability to 
the factors of intent, motive and circumstances that determine the extent to 
which the offender should be held accountable for the act.171 
  In relation to the culpability component, [they] import substantive criminal 
law doctrines of culpability such as intention, recklessness, and negligence and 
excuses such as provocation into the sentencing stage.172 But they contend that 
such an approach is not possible with respect to harm, where they claim that 
“virtually no legal doctrines have been developed on how the gravity of harms 
can be compared.”173 Thus, the focus of their inquiry is giving content to the 
harm component.174 
  [They] approach this task by considering the seriousness of an offense 
against a background of important human concerns, and confine their analysis 
to conduct that is (already) criminal and injures or threatens identifiable 
victims.175 Aggravating or mitigating considerations are not addressed due to 
the complexity that this would import. In a bid to gauge the level of harm 
caused by an offence, the starting point for von Hirsch and Jareborg is to use a 
broad-based “living standard” criterion where the gravity of criminal harm is 
determined “by the importance that the relevant interests have for a person’s 
standard of living.”176 The living standard focuses “on the means or 
capabilities for achieving a certain quality of life,” rather than actual life 
quality or goal achievement,177 and is adapted from the criteria set out by 
Amartya Sen, which encompasses non-economic and economic interests.178 
 
overview of Robinson’s approach, see Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory, 
supra note 164; Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 164. 
 171. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87; Andrew von Hirsch & 
Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 2–3 (1991) [hereinafter von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm]. 
 172. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 3. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87. 
 175. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 3. 
 176. Id. at 12. 
 177. Id. at 10. 
 178. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 87; VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 144. 
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  They formulate four living standard levels, which are used to determine the 
degree to which a particular crime affects a person’s living standard.179 The 
most important is subsistence, which equates to survival with no more than 
basic capacities to function and then follows minimal well-being and adequate 
well-being, which mean maintenance of a minimum and adequate level of 
comfort and dignity, respectively. Finally, there is enhanced well-being, which 
is defined as significant enhancement of quality of life.180 The most grievous 
harms are those which most drastically diminish one’s standard of well-
being.181 Thus, a crime which violates the first level (subsistence) is the most 
serious, whereas one which infringes only enhanced well-being is the least 
serious.182 
  Next, they determine the type of interests which are violated or threatened 
by the paradigm instances of particular offenses. They identify four basic types 
of interests. In descending order they are physical integrity, material support 
and amenity (ranging from nutrition and shelter to various luxuries), freedom 
from humiliating or degrading treatment, and privacy and autonomy.183 Some 
interest dimensions such as physical integrity are applicable to all of the grades 
on the living-standard scale, depending on the level of intrusion, whereas other 
interests such as privacy and autonomy are confined to levels including and 
below minimum well-being.184 After the interest violated by the typical 
instance of a particular offense is ascertained the effect on the living standard 
is then determined.185 
For example, in the case of a stock-in-trade burglary, physical integrity is not 
affected, and, assuming the item stolen is inexpensive and easily replaceable, 
material amenity is also scarcely affected. Privacy is more significantly 
affected; hence, on the living standard, it ranks at level four (as affecting 
enhanced well-being).186 
After the harm scale score is determined, discounts are accorded where 
crimes create only a risk or threat to a particular interest: the remoter the risk or 
less likely the threat, the greater the discount.187 As such, attempted offenses 
 
 179. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 17. 
 180. These grades are further elaborated at von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, 
supra note 171, at 17–19. They make the obvious point that there will be variations within the 
four grades. 
 181. See id. at 17. 
 182. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88. 
 183. For an elaboration of these concepts, see von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal 
Harm, supra note 171, at 19–21. In later analysis, autonomy and freedom from degrading 
treatment are not mentioned. 
 184. Id. at 21. 
 185. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88; von Hirsch & Jareborg, 
Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 20. 
 186. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 27. 
 187. Id. at 30. 
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are regarded as being less serious than completed ones. Von Hirsch and 
Jareborg do not address at length the issue of culpability but suggest that 
discounts should also be given for less blameworthy states of mind.188 Thus, 
harm caused, say, negligently, does not rate as high as when it is caused 
intentionally. 
In a nutshell, the argument is that the seriousness of an offense is gauged 
by the impact that the crime has on the living standard of the typical victim.189 
The approach is made more appealing by the fact that it applies to 
standardized measures for a good life, as opposed to that which is applicable to 
a particular victim.190 A further advantage of the theory is that the same 
principal variables can also be used to assess sanction severity. Thus, as noted 
by von Hirsch and Ashworth: “Imprisonment thus qualifies as a severe penalty, 
because the interests in freedom of movement and privacy it takes away are 
normally so vital to a good existence.”191 
To determine the seriousness of a crime, a logical starting point is to assess 
the level of detriment inflicted, where the level of detriment is viewed from the 
perspective of important human concerns. Von Hirsch and Jareborg identify 
what they regard as important human concerns and also go about ranking 
them—as they must do—to give some content to their formulation.192 The 
problem, however, with their ranking system is that, despite conceding that 
their analysis is normative, “since it is a theory on how harms ought to be 
rated,193 it is devoid of an underlying rationale or an empirical or scientific 
foundation—it is built on armchair speculation.”194 
Intuition aside, we are not told why privacy and autonomy are any less 
important than, say, freedom from humiliation. In order to determine such 
issues, an underlying moral and scientific theory is needed. 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg accept the need for a moral theory, however, they are 
content to rest their case on the basis that an “articulated moral theory” 
 
 188. Id. at 3. They accept that the substantive criminal law doctrines of culpability may be 
“drawn upon” at sentencing stage, and they imply that their analysis is sufficiently sensitive to 
compare harm caused intentionally as opposed to negligently. 
 189. Id. at 33. 
 190. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 146. 
 191. Id. at 148. But it does not apply so clearly to other sanctions: 
There remain, however, certain practical problems of applying an interest analysis 
approach to gauging the severity of sanctions: the exercise is much easier for terms of 
imprisonment and for financial penalties than it is for community penalties and other non-
custodial measures, which can vary so much in their conditions and in the extent of their 
restrictions on liberty. 
Id. 
 192. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 17–18. 
 193. Id. at 5–6. 
 194. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88. 
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underpinning the living standard is beyond the scope of their discussion.195 
They go on to state that they are “not trying to develop an invariant harm-
analysis but, instead to derive ratings applicable here, given certain prevailing 
social practices and also certain ethical traditions.”196 Some of the social 
practices they assume are spelled out, such as the social convention that home 
is important for a comfortable existence. However, the detail we are not given 
is which “ethical traditions” have been assumed.197 
[They] state that the living standard for gauging harm is used because “it 
appears to fit the way one ordinarily judges harms.”198 Further, the “living 
standard provides, not a generalized ethical norm, but a useful standard which 
the law can use in gauging the harmfulness of criminal acts.”199 This, however, 
raises the questions: useful in what sense? And how useful?200 
Any standard is useful because it will at least assist in achieving uniformity in 
sentencing. However, a standard based on spiritual or purely economic well-
being will also achieve that. Von Hirsch and Jareborg attempt (unpersuasively) 
to turn the criticism that their theory lacks a justification into an advantage: 
“The living standard approach also has the advantage of a certain modesty; no 
‘deep’ theory of preferred life-aims or appropriate social roles is 
presupposed.”201 
  The selection and adoption of certain harms in preference to others can 
only be justified by reference to an underlying moral and social theory, which 
is informed by empirical data. To this end, an obvious candidate is 
utilitarianism, which offers a simple method for determining the types of 
interests that are relevant to harm seriousness: The reason that some interests 
are important and worthy of protection by the criminal law is because they are 
integral to the attainment of happiness. In fact, the approach adopted (and 
conclusions reached) by von Hirsch and Jareborg have much in common with 
a transparently utilitarian evaluation of harm analysis.202 
The considerations they identify seem to map well onto a (tenable) utilitarian 
scale of the primacy of interests relevant to happiness. For example, it is 
feasible to suggest that the most essential requirement to the attainment of any 
degree of meaningful happiness is physical integrity and subsistence, followed 
by material support and minimal well-being, and so on. The next thing many 
seem to value most is material support. Freedom from humiliation and privacy 
 
 195. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 15. 
 196. Id. (emphasis added). 
 197. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88. 
 198. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 11. 
 199. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis added). 
 200. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88. 
 201. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm, supra note 171, at 12. 
 202. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 88–89. 
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and autonomy, though not necessarily in that order, are seen to be important 
interests towards the road to happiness. 
2. Studies Measuring the Variables Relevant to Happiness and Moving 
from “Happiness” to “Well-Being” as a Standard Measure 
  A more doctrinally consistent manner to gauge the seriousness of harm is 
to adopt a utilitarian primary rationale and then to prescribe weight to defined 
interests in accordance with empirical observations [about the interests that are 
valued most highly]. The potential disadvantage of this approach is that the 
notion of happiness is inherently vague. However, over the past few decades 
there has been an increase in the number of studies conducted into human 
happiness and well-being. Happiness has become a scientific rather than a 
purely theoretical concept. The overriding pursuit of happiness is now 
increasingly a psychological truism rather than an obscure aspirational 
objective. There is now a dedicated international journal (the Journal of 
Happiness Studies) which is devoted to articles [based on empirical studies of] 
what makes people happy (or indeed unhappy).203 Over the last few years there 
has been a number of important works looking at what makes people happy 
and, in particular, looking at whether there is a positive or negative correlation 
between happiness and wealth creation.204 
  While noting the diversity in the range of activities through which people 
choose to express themselves, the studies show that basically we are not that 
different after all. At the core, humans are wired pretty much the same. While 
some people prefer singing in a choir as opposed to boxing in a ring and others 
prefer repairing motor vehicles to writing poetry, we should not allow these 
superficial differences to divert us from the fact that we have the same basal 
needs and our well-being is promoted by the same type of things.205 
 
 203. JOURNAL OF HAPPINESS STUDIES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FORUM OF SUBJECTIVE 
WELL-BEING, http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/wellbeing+%26+quality-of-life/journal/ 
10902 [http://perma.cc/KC6D-EAB7] (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 204. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; see, e.g., Claudia Wallis et 
al., The New Science of Happiness, TIME, Jan. 17, 2005 (devoting the entire issue to this topic). 
 205. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; This is the trend of 
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MICHAEL ARGYLE ET AL., Happiness as a Function of Personality and Social Encounters, in 
RECENT ADVANCES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189 (Joseph P. 
Forgas & J. Michael Innes eds., 1989); TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM (2002); 
DAVID G. MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: DISCOVERING THE PATHWAY TO FULFILLMENT, 
WELL-BEING, AND ENDURING PERSONAL JOY (1992); Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly 
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REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2002). 
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  The studies indicate that we can now, with a growing degree of 
confidence, identify the things that make people happy.206 People have the 
same basic wants and needs. In a nutshell, the things that are conducive to 
happiness are fit and healthy bodies, realistic goals, self-esteem, optimism, an 
outgoing personality, a sense of control, close relationships, challenging work, 
and active leisure, punctuated by adequate rest and a faith that entails 
communal support, purpose, and acceptance. Myths about happiness include 
that it is bought by money and that religious faith suppresses happiness.207 
  However, the relevant studies have not been conducted with a view to 
providing insight into calculations of offence seriousness or sanction severity. 
Nevertheless, a number of tentative conclusions can be made regarding the 
relevance of the studies to proportionalism.208 
  First, property offences [which deprive victims of a degree of wealth (as 
opposed to diminishing their personal security] are . . . overrated in terms of 
their seriousness. Wealth has little effect on personal happiness; hence, the 
criminal justice system should view these offences less seriously. The only 
occasions where property offences make a significant adverse impact on 
victims is where they result in the victim living in a state of poverty.209 
This argument is intuitively challenging. This is especially the case where an 
offense destroys wealth, which is emotionally important, even though no net 
financial loss occurs (for example, where artistic work is destroyed, but 
insurance is paid) or when an individual is reduced from high levels of wealth 
and resources to a considerably lower level (and hence loses the ability to act 
charitably to others). In these situations the studies do not debunk the view that 
the victim will not experience considerable unhappiness. First, the studies are 
not acute enough to evaluate the impact on well-being of loss of sentimental or 
emotional objects. However, the studies firmly establish210 that if a 
considerable reduction in well-being does flow from such a loss, it is not 
because of deprivation of resources per se, but the incidental deprivations that 
stem from this (in the form of emotional separation and inability to confer 
generosity). 
The second conclusion that follows from the above studies is that: 
[O]ffences which imperil a person’s sense of security or otherwise negatively 
affect a person’s health and capacity to lead a free and autonomous life should 
 
 206. Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming 
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 207. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 89; Bagaric & McConvill, 
supra note 206, at 17. Also, generally see this edition of the Deakin Law Review, which is a 
thematic edition, regarding the link between law and happiness research. 
 208. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90. 
 209. Id. (emphasis added). 
 210. See RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990); 
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be punished severely. These implications are of limited value for informing the 
proportionality principle because, as noted above, they do not directly examine 
the effects of crime. Further, the studies are not conclusive regarding the 
criteria that are relevant to happiness.211 
  However, the concept of developing an index of the variables that affect 
human prosperity is becoming increasingly mainstream. The indexes, however, 
generally use different nomenclature from that conventionally adopted by 
utilitarians. The key concept is normally defined as “well-being” as opposed to 
“happiness.” It is not clear whether this is a difference in substance. However, 
in principle, it is preferable because the notion of well-being appears, at least 
intuitively, to relate to enduring (as opposed to transient) traits and hence is 
likely to have wider appeal.212 
  The concept of well-being is becoming so mainstream that in some 
contexts it is replacing or complementing conventional and widely accepted 
economic indicia for evaluating human progress and achievement. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] has 
developed a “Better Life Index,” which attempts to set out and prioritise the 
matters that are most essential for human well-being.213 The index lists eleven 
criteria for measuring life quality that allows nations to develop their priorities 
and distinguishes between responses from men and women.214 It transpires 
that men and women have near identical priorities.215 The order from most to 
least important is life satisfaction, health, education, work-life balance, 
environment, jobs, safety, housing, community, income, and civic 
engagement.216 
3. Studies That Directly Measure the Impact of Crime 
  Even more relevant to an assessment of the severity of crime are studies 
that measure the impact of certain crime offence categories on victims. The 
best information available suggests that, typically, victims of violent and 
sexual crime suffer considerably and, in fact, more than is manifest from the 
obvious and direct effects of crime.217 
The problem with some studies is that they do not distinguish adequately 
between different types of crime to determine the relative impact of criminal 
offense types. However, the data available suggest that victims of violent crime 
 
 211. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90. 
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 216. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 90; OECD, supra note 213. 
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and sexual crime have their well-being more significantly set back than for 
other types of crime. 
  Rochelle Hanson, Genelle Sawyer, Angela Begle, and Grace Hubel (2010) 
reviewed the existing literature regarding the effects of violent and sexual 
crimes on key quality of life indices.218 The crimes examined included rape, 
sexual assault, aggravated assault, survivors of homicide (i.e. relatives of those 
killed), and intimate partner violence. The key quality of life indicia examined 
were role function (i.e. capacity to perform in the roles of parenting and 
intimate relationships and to function in the social and occupational domains), 
reported levels of life satisfaction, and, well-being and social-material 
conditions (i.e. physical and mental health conditions).219 The report 
demonstrated that many victims suffered considerably across a range of well-
being indicia, well after the physical signs had passed.220 The report 
concluded: 
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general trauma and 
the emerging research on crime victimization indicate significant 
functional impact on the quality of life for victims. However, more 
research is necessary to understand the mechanisms of these relationships 
and differences amongst types of crime victimization, gender, and 
racial/ethnic groups.221 
  Findings showed that victims of violent crime and sexual crime in 
particular have: 
 Difficulty in being involved in intimate relationships and far higher 
divorce rates;222 
 Diminished parenting skills (although this finding was not universal);223 
 Lower levels of success in the employment setting (especially in relation 
to victims who had been abused by their partners) and much higher 
levels of unemployment;224 
 Considerable impairment and dysfunction in social and leisure activities, 
with many victims retreating from conventional social supports;225 and 
 High levels of direct medical costs associated with violent crime (over 
$US24,353 for an assault requiring hospitalisation).226 
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A study published in 2006, focusing on victims in the United Kingdom, found 
that: 
 Victims of violent crime were 2.6 times as likely as non-victims to 
suffer from depression and 1.8 times as likely to exhibit hostile behavior 
five years after the original offense;227 and, 
 For fifty-two percent of women who had been seriously sexually 
assaulted in their lives, their experience led to either depression or other 
emotional problems, and for one in twenty it led to attempted suicide 
(64,000 women living in England and Wales today have tried to kill 
themselves following a serious sexual assault).228 
Chester L. Britt, in a study examining the effects of either violent or property 
crime on the health of 2430 respondents,229 noted: “Victims of violent crime 
reported lower levels of perceived health and physical wellbeing, controlling 
for measures of injury and for sociodemographic characteristics.”230 
These findings were not confined to violent crime. Victims of property 
crime also reported reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less 
profound than in the case of violent crime.231 
4. The Irrelevance of Other Factors to Crime Severity 
  The ranking of crime is made complicated by the fact that, typically, it is 
thought to involve consideration of both the harm caused by the offence and 
the culpability of the offender and, according to some theorists, certain 
aggravating and mitigating considerations (and, in particular, the prior 
criminality of the offender).232 There is, however, no principled reason for 
infusing either of these into an assessment of offence severity.233 
  This variable-rich approach to offence severity is consistent with the 
manner in which courts have often interpreted the proportionality principle. 
However, it is flawed. There are several problems with allowing factors not 
directly related to the offence to have a role in evaluating offence 
seriousness.234 
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  First, it is contradictory to claim that the principle of proportionality means 
the punishment should be commensurate with the objective seriousness of the 
offence and then allow considerations external to the offence to have a role in 
determining how much punishment is appropriate. Once the inquiry extends to 
matters not even remotely connected with the crime, such as the offender’s 
upbringing or previous convictions, the parameters of the offence have been 
clearly exhausted.235 
  Second, by importing other considerations (especially aggravating and 
mitigating factors) into proportionalism, much of the splendour of the principle 
of proportionality is dissipated. The principle then cannot be claimed as being 
indicative of anything: To ascertain how much to punish, the appealing idea of 
looking only at the objective seriousness of the offence is abandoned and the 
inquiry must move elsewhere—and, indeed, everywhere.236 Giving content to 
the principle of proportionality would become unworkable—as is currently the 
case. In each particular sentencing inquiry the principle would need to be 
flexible enough to accommodate not only the objective circumstances of the 
offence but also the mitigating [and aggravating] circumstances. Given the 
uniqueness of each offender’s personal circumstances and the vast number of 
variables which are supposedly relevant to such an inquiry and the fact that 
mitigating factors often pull in a diametrically opposite direction to the 
objective factors relevant to the offence, any attempt to provide a workable 
principle of proportionality must fail. It was for this reason that von Hirsch and 
Jareborg, when elaborating on the matters that are relevant to gauging the 
seriousness of the offence, declined to consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.237 
A non-tautologous definition of proportionality would be impossible if the 
proportionality principle must accommodate the full range of supposed 
sentencing considerations.238 
  The above analysis provides some guidance regarding measuring offence 
seriousness. Further clarity will emerge if the focus on graduating offences 
commences with offences that have identifiable victims. Once a degree of 
consensus is obtained in that context, assessments should then be made in 
relation to offences that have less identifiable and more remote forms of harm, 
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such as drug and motor traffic offences [and offences that potentially 
undermine important institutional structures and processes, such as perjury].239 
5. Evaluating the Hardship of Sanctions 
  While there has been some consideration of measuring crime severity, 
there has been less attention given to the other side of the proportionality 
equation: measuring punishment severity. Ryberg contends this is because of 
the underlying belief that the “answer is pretty straightforward”240—with 
imprisonment being clearly the harshest disposition. As Ryberg notes, the 
answer would seem to rest on “the negative impact on the well-being of the 
[punished].”241 Von Hirsch and Ashworth (2005) also believe that it is less 
complex to rank punishments because the appropriate reference point seems to 
be the degree of suffering or inconvenience caused to the offender.242 
  Other criteria have been invoked, including community views about the 
hardship of a penalty. To this end, a number of opinion surveys have been 
undertaken.243 
[W]hile community attitudes are a tool that can be used to assess penalty 
severity, they are an inadequate measure because of the lack of practical 
knowledge of the survey participants. To this end, the relevant insight can only 
come from those who have experienced the relevant sanction.244 
  The starting point is to evaluate the adverse impact of imprisonment, given 
that it is the harshest sanction and the one which probably has the least amount 
of diversity in its application. In all societies it minimally involves physical 
confinement. It is surprising how little research has been conducted into the 
extent to which this sanction actually sets back well-being.245 
 
 239. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 93. George Fletcher notes the 
lesser evident role of proportionality in relation to such offenses: 
Just punishment requires a sense of proportion, which in turn requires sensitivity to the 
injury inflicted. . . . The more the victim suffers, the more pain should be inflicted on the 
criminal. In the context of betrayal, the gears of this basic principle of justice, the lex 
talionis, fail to engage the problem. The theory of punishment does not mesh with the 
crime when there is no tangible harm, no friction against the physical welfare of the 
victim. 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 43 (1993). 
However, more accurately, it is not that proportionality has no role in relation to such offenses; 
rather, in such cases it must focus on generalizing the harm involved in that type of behavior and 
is hence more difficult to apply. 
 240. RYBERG, supra note 112, at 102. 
 241. Id. at 102–03 
 242. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 93; VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 140. 
 243. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 94; VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 158, at 148. 
 244. Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing, supra note 109, at 94. 
 245. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING 213 
  The direct adverse impact of prison conditions has been well documented. 
And it has been known for several decades that the “pains” of imprisonment 
extend far beyond the deprivation of liberty. Other negative consequences of 
imprisonment are: 
 The deprivation of goods and services;246 
 The deprivation of heterosexual relationships;247 
 The deprivation of autonomy;248 and 
 The deprivation of security.249 
In addition to this, more recent data notes violence continues to be a major 
hazard in jail, with a recent survey showing that nearly one-third of state 
prisoners reported injuries that were either violence-related or accidental.250 
  What is less well understood is how these deprivations affect the life 
trajectories of prisoners. The evidence available indicates that it has a 
considerable negative impact which transcends the actual term of 
imprisonment. Imprisonment seems to have an adverse effect on well-being 
measures after the conclusion of the sentence, even to the point of significantly 
reducing life expectancy.251 
  A study which examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners 
in the US state of Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners 
than for the rest of the population.252 There were 2,650 deaths in total, which 
was a 43 per cent higher mortality rate than normally expected (799 more ex-
prisoners died than expected).253 The main causes for the increased mortality 
rates were homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (which 
included drug overdoses) and suicide.254 
The period immediately following release is especially precarious for 
offenders, with studies showing that in the two weeks following release, ex-
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prisoners are more than thirteen times more likely to die than people in the 
general population.255 
Many offenders released from prison continue to have their well-being set 
back in more ways than increased mortality rates. A recent New Zealand 
study256 showed that post-release offenders displayed vulnerabilities associated 
with financial matters, drug temptations, decision-making, and social 
interactions.257 
Former prisoners without strong social networks were especially 
vulnerable and often had difficulty meeting their own basic needs, including 
experiencing hunger and homelessness, and being unable to access health 
care.258 Imprisonment also has a profoundly negative effect on the families of 
prisoners. Married men who have served time in jail are three times more 
likely to divorce than those who had not been incarcerated but had been 
convicted of an offense,259 and the families of prisoners have higher rates of 
homelessness.260 Moreover, studies report that “fathers’ incarceration is 
stressful for children, increasing both depression and anxiety as well as 
antisocial behavior.”261 Most studies also find that ex-prisoners find it more 
difficult to secure employment, and they have also have a considerably lower 
rate of lifetime earnings.262 
  The data, although only cursory, suggests that imprisonment is a more 
painful disposition than appears at face value. It is even more complex to make 
an assessment of the severity of other sanctions such as probation, community 
work orders, and fines because of their variability. But at least, in theory, the 
problem is not insurmountable. The severity of sanctions would be evaluated 
by reference to their level of “onerousness.” Ryberg uses similar terminology 
in suggesting that the answer would seem to rest on “negative impact on the 
well-being of the [punished].”263 This requires the same types of 
considerations as those involved in the assessment of the other limb of the 
proportionality thesis.264 
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  It has been suggested that one cannot grade the severity of penalties 
because painfulness is a subjective concept.265 A taxidriver who is deprived of 
his or her licence feels the pain more severely than a person who works from 
home. This is no doubt true, but the same applies regarding the harm caused by 
criminal offences. Pickpocketing US$5 from Bill Gates is hardly likely to 
cause him even the slightest angst, whereas stealing the last US$5 from a 
hungry, homeless person may have a devastating effect upon him or her. 
Despite the enormous difference in the impact of these offences, the law has no 
difficulty in making theft an offence, and [secondly], it has not resiled from 
evaluating the general seriousness of such conduct.266 This is because in 
relation to any branch of law, generalisations must be made about the things 
that people value and the typical effect of certain behaviour on those 
interests.267 
6. Matching the Punishment to the Offense: Worst Crimes to the Worst 
Forms of Punishment 
  The final problem regarding proportionality is how to match the severity of 
the punishment with the seriousness of the offence. The relative brevity of this 
discussion is not a reflection of the importance or the level of controversy in 
this area. Rather, given the discussion above, the answer is straightforward. 
The type and degree of punishment imposed on offenders should cause them to 
have their well-being set back to an amount equal to that which the crime sets 
back the well-being of the victim.268 
This is in keeping with the approach of some other theorists. Von Hirsch 
asserts that an interests analysis, similar to the living-standard analysis he 
adopts for gauging crime seriousness, should be used to estimate the severity 
of penalties.269 Ashworth states that proportionality at the outer limits 
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“excludes punishments which impose far greater hardships on the offender 
than does the crime on victims and society in general.”270 
The above approach “assesses both the hardship of punishment and the 
severity of crime from the perspective of the extent to which they set back 
typical human well-being. This enables a theoretical matching at least to be 
made. There are insufficient data currently to allow a precise ranking.”271 
In order for proportionality to play a more definitive role in sentencing, 
there is a need for further relevant empirically-validated research. It is beyond 
the realm of lawyers, criminologists, and jurists to complete this task, which 
requires drawing on findings in other disciplines, in particular, sociology and 
psychology. There is a need to tailor the research to focus on victims of crime 
and, in particular, offenders who have been subjected to criminal sanctions. 
While development of the proportionality doctrine is in its early stages, 
there are some tentative observations that can be made, which can provide 
concrete guidance to legislators and judges. First, the crimes that have the most 
serious adverse consequences for victims are assault and sexual offenses. 
Secondly, the adverse effects of imprisonment seem to have been underrated 
and often extend to more distant forms of serious harms, including 
significantly reduced life expectancy. In light of this, a reasonable starting 
point is that, generally, imprisonment should be imposed only for sexual and 
violent offenses, and most prison terms should be reduced compared to those 
currently imposed. Of course, this says nothing about the length of 
imprisonment that is appropriate for certain categories of sexual and violent 
offenses. Yet, this crude empirically-based technique is preferable to the 
randomness that currently exists in relation to offense and sanction matching. 
V.  RETAINING THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
Despite the large number of fixed penalties in the United States, they are 
widely despised by commentators in the United States and beyond. It has been 
noted that this is especially the case in Australia and the United Kingdom, 
where judges “in some sense [feel that they] own sentencing and that 
legislative encumbrances on that ownership are inherently inappropriate.”272 In 
the United States context, Michael Tonry notes that: “The greatest gap between 
knowledge and policy in American sentencing concerns mandatory penalties. 
Experienced practitioners and social science researchers have long agreed, for 
practical and policy reasons . . . that mandatory penalties are a bad idea.”273 
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Such sentiments are widely held. In a forum devoted to the concept of 
mandatory sentencing legislation in a leading Australian law journal,274 there 
were eight separate papers on the topic, and there was not a single nice word to 
be had for mandatory sentences. Despite this, all of the criticisms are over-
stated; they can all be surmounted by the implementation of proportionate 
fixed penalties. Before we analyze the key criticisms of fixed penalties, we 
discuss their main benefit. 
A. Fixed Penalties Are Necessary for Transparent and Consistent Sentencing 
While fixed penalties are unpopular, they are less bad than the alternative: 
wide-ranging penalty ranges whereby it is left to the discretion of the 
sentencing judge to implement the exact penalty. This is the process that 
previously prevailed in the United States and led Justice Marvel Frankel to 
describe the system as lawless.275 It is the current system that operates in 
Australia and is responsible for a largely unpredictable and inconsistent 
sentencing system. 
  The overarching methodology and conceptual approach that [Australian] 
sentencing judges undertake in making sentencing decisions is [known as the] 
“instinctive synthesis.” The term originates from the Full Court of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria decision of R v Williscroft, where Adam and Crockett JJ 
stated: “Now, ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing 
judge’s instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in the punitive 
process[.]”276 
  The process of instinctive synthesis is a mechanism whereby sentencers 
make a decision regarding all of the considerations that are relevant to 
sentencing, and then give due weight to each of them (and, in the process, 
incorporate considerations that incline to a heavier penalty and offset against 
them factors that favour a lesser penalty), and then set a precise penalty. The 
hallmark of this process is that it does not require (nor permit) judges to set out 
with any particularity277 the weight (in mathematical terms) accorded to any 
particular consideration.278 
 
 274. 22 U. N.S. WALES L.J. (1999). 
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 276. Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness to Arbitrariness, supra note 14, at 79; R v 
Williscroft [1975] VR 292 (Austl.). 
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Patent subjectivity is incorporated into the sentencing calculus. 
Current orthodoxy maintains that there is no single correct sentence,279 and 
that the “instinctive synthesis will, by definition, produce outcomes upon 
which reasonable minds will differ[.]”280 Under this model, courts can impose 
a sentence within an “available range” of penalties. The spectrum of this range 
is not clearly designated.281 
  Predicting or anticipating the likely outcome of this process is made much 
harder by the fact that it is for the court to determine the weight to be accorded 
to any particular aggravating or mitigating factor.282 There is no effective fetter 
to prevent courts from giving, say, 40 per cent or 2 per cent weight to a 
particular consideration, such as remorse,283 in order to mitigate a penalty, or 
an aggravating factor such as prior criminality in order to increase the 
penalty.284 As noted in DPP (VIC) v Terrick: “The proposition that too 
much—or too little—weight was given to a particular sentencing factor is 
almost always untestable. This is so because quantitative significance is not to 
be assigned to individual considerations.”285 
  In Pesa v The Queen, the Court acknowledged that the absence of the 
attribution of weight to considerations in sentencing decisions made them 
“opaque”: 
[So far as weight is concerned] the ultimate sentencing decision is entirely 
opaque. While the sentencing reasons record the judge’s consideration of 
the various matters relevant to sentence, the sentencing decision itself is a 
conclusion arrived at by the process of intuitive synthesis, without the 
attribution of weight to any individual factor.286 
A key problem with the instinctive synthesis is that it leads to inconsistent 
sentences. There is considerable evidence to support this proposition. 
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[T]he Australian Law Reform Commission report, Same Crime, Same Time: 
The Sentencing of Federal Offenders,287 looked at sentences across Australia 
involving the same offences (focusing on drug and fraud offences where the 
courts were all applying the federal sentencing regime),288 and noted 
considerable differences in penalties across the jurisdictions.289 
  For example, the report looked at 63 instances of trafficking a commercial 
quantity of MDMA (3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methamphetamine, or Ecstasy) 
during the five-year period 2000–2004.290 The jurisdictions where most cases 
occurred were New South Wales, Western Australia and Victoria. Overall, the 
mean terms (maximum and minimum) combined for all three states were 136 
and 66 months, respectively, while for each individual state they were as 
follows: in New South Wales: 154: 72; Western Australia: 132: 69; Victoria: 
66: 39.291 
  For a commercial quantity of heroin there were 155 cases, of which 86 per 
cent involved this charge only.292 The mean term for these three states 
combined was 87: 48, but, once again, there were considerable regional 
differences for each state; i.e., in New South Wales: 81: 48; Western Australia: 
169:70; Victoria: 65:43.293 
  The level of inconsistency is also demonstrated by research reports which 
compare similarly placed offenders who are subjected to vastly different 
penalties. The most recent example of this is a 2013 report by the Victorian 
Advisory Council entitled Reoffending Following Sentencing in the 
Magistrates’ Court of Victoria.294 One of the purposes of this report was to 
ascertain whether offenders who were sentenced to imprisonment reoffended 
at different rates from those sentenced to other sanctions.295 To this end, the 
empirical data show that harsh punishment does not discourage offenders from 
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further offending and, in fact, may even result in a higher incidence of future 
offending.296 The theory of specific deterrence is false. The report supported 
this finding—i.e., offenders sentenced to imprisonment generally reoffended at 
a higher rate than those subjected to more lenient dispositions.297 This 
information is not new.298 
  The most illuminating aspect of the report for the purposes of this article is 
the manner in which the conclusion was derived. The methodology involved 
comparing the recidivism rates of offenders who had been sentenced to 
imprisonment with those who were subjected to more lenient dispositions, 
including wholly suspended sentences.299 This involved controlling the 
respective samples for factors that could influence the result (eg, prior criminal 
record, age, offence type and sex).300 Thus, the methodology involved using 
matched sub-samples. 
  It is striking that identically situated offenders could be subjected to such 
vastly different outcomes. This can only occur against the backdrop of a 
largely unfettered judicial sentencing discretion, without adequate regard to the 
need for consistency in the outcome of sentences.301 
B. Fixed Penalties Are Necessary to Minimize Subconscious Bias in 
Sentencing 
The key problem with a largely unfettered sentencing discretion is that it 
invariably leads to the sentences based on the personal predispositions of 
judges; the process is inherently non-transparent and inconsistent. 
  Judges are understandably outcome driven, but what often makes the 
outcomes unacceptable are the hidden influences which underpin them. All 
humans have preferences and biases. The most difficult to negate are those of 
which the holder is unaware. Judges, like all people, view themselves as being 
objective and fair while having a bias blind spot when it comes to their own 
decision-making.302 Judge Richard Posner in his seminal work, How Judges 
Think, states: “We use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations of bias, 
while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify bias in others.”303 
The default position of people “is to assume that their judgments are 
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uncontaminated”304 with implicit bias and that “judges are inclined to make the 
same sorts of favourable assumptions about their own abilities that non-judges 
do[.]”305 The truth is otherwise. All people are influenced by their life journey 
and “are more favourably disposed to the familiar, and fear or become 
frustrated with the unfamiliar[.]”306 
  The evidence regarding the impact of implicit judicial bias is considerable. 
The range of traits that influence the outcome of decisions is wide-ranging. 
Thus, we see that attractive offenders receive more lenient penalties than other 
accused—except when the attractive appearance is used to facilitate the 
crime.307 In one study, 77 per cent of unattractive defendants received a prison 
term, while only 46 per cent of attractive defendants were subjected to the 
same penalty.308 Thus, unattractive people are approximately 50 per cent more 
likely to be imprisoned than attractive people.309 
  Gender also influences sentences, with a United States study examining 
over [20,000] records showing that females are treated more leniently than 
males.310 
  There is firm evidence of judicial bias on the basis of race. Jeffrey 
Rachlinski [and Sheri Johnson] show that white judges display a strong white 
preference in their decisions, while black judges display no overall 
preference.311 They note that a key way to deal with this is to bring the biases 
to the surface: “[W]hen judges are aware of a need to monitor their own 
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to 
suppress that bias, they appear able to do so[.]”312 
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  Racial discrimination in sentencing has been long documented.313 In one 
of the most wide-ranging surveys, using data from over 77,000 offenders that 
were sentenced, the data revealed that a black defendant who is sentenced in 
the same court and who commits the same offence and has the same criminal 
history as a white accused, will receive a 12 per cent longer prison term than a 
white offender.314 
  Judicial bias extends well beyond race to matters such as socioeconomic 
background. A recent analysis of child custody cases showed that judges 
favour wealthy litigants to those who are impoverished, leading to worse case 
outcomes for people of low incomes.315 
  Victim traits also impact sentencing outcomes. Black offenders who harm 
white victims were found to receive heavier penalties than when the victim 
was black, presumably because “the judges were also White, and their in-
group or worldview was more threatened by criminal conduct against persons 
from their in-group[.]”316 
  The mindset of a judge also influences the outcome of criminal cases. In 
one study, a mock file (where the offender was charged with prostitution) was 
assigned to judges who were requested to set bail. Half of the judges were 
instructed to think about their own death before setting bail. It transpired that 
they set bail at a much higher amount (US$455) compared to the control group 
(US$50).317 
  The comfort level of a judge affects case outcome. In a recent study, 
offenders were better treated after, rather than before, a judicial meal break. A 
study examining the decisions of a parole court in Israel over a 10 month 
period, and taking into account over 1000 rulings, ascertained that the single 
biggest influence on whether a prisoner was granted parole was the length of 
time that had passed since the judge had a meal break.318 After the meal 
breaks, judges would grant parole at the rate of 65 per cent and it would drop 
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to between 0 and 10 per cent as time wore on.319 The researchers speculated 
that the reason for this was because: 
[A]ll repetitive decision-making tasks drain our mental resources. We start 
suffering from “choice overload” and we start opting for the easiest 
choice. . . . And when it comes to parole hearings, the default choice is to 
deny the prisoner’s request. The more decisions a judge has made, the 
more drained they are, and the more likely they are to make the default 
choice. Taking a break replenishes them.320 
  A type of bias that has potentially important implications for sentencing 
. . . is what is known as the “anchoring effect[.]” Research shows that judges, 
like all people, are affected by the requests and demands of others, including 
prosecutors and even inexperienced people regarding their expectation of 
sentence.321 
[T]he anchoring effect322 . . . is a bias people form towards evaluating numbers 
by focusing on a numerical reference point and making adjustments from that 
point. Most people place disproportionate emphasis on the initial anchor, so far 
as it impacts their final figure.323 One study showed that experienced judges 
were influenced by submissions regarding sentence, even if they were not 
made by experts. In the study, a computer science student who was acting in 
the role of a prosecutor made either a demand for a high sentence (34 months) 
or low sentence (12 months) for the identical crime (rape).324 
The judges who received the high demand gave a sentence, which, on 
average, was eight months longer than those who received the demand for 
the lower sentence. This study confirms results in other studies focusing 
on damages awards in civil cases and in non-legal settings that show that 
even arbitrary and irrelevant numbers have an anchoring effect.325 
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More subtle studies undertaken in the criminal law setting suggest that 
prosecution sentencing submissions have a considerable influence on judges, 
which are only partly moderated by contrary defense submissions. This may be 
partly because “defense attorneys assimilate their sentencing demand to the 
demand from the prosecutor[,]”326 and that is an “unintended process[.]”327 
The suggested reason for this is the sequence in the courtroom: 
By granting the defense attorney the right of the last word, the legal system 
simultaneously grants the prosecutor the right of the first word. This 
allows the prosecution to introduce a judgmental anchor that determines 
the final sentence, by influencing the judge not only directly, but also (and 
predominantly) indirectly via its influence on the defense attorney’s 
demand.328 
The way to negate judicial subconscious bias is to limit the ambit of the 
judicial discretion. 
As noted by Posner, judges, like all people, are utility maximizers and gain 
satisfaction from different aspects of their role, including its prestige and 
influence.329 In making decisions, judges give effect to their own preferences, 
which are contingent upon their “background, temperament, training, 
experience, and ideology, which shape his [or her] preconceptions and thus his 
[or her] response to arguments and evidence[.]”330 
[Absent legislative curtailment of the sentencing discretion,] [j]udges are 
unlikely to make the sentencing determination process more clear and in the 
process reduce their capacity to craft a decision affirming what they believe is 
the appropriate result. This would be inconsistent with human nature. 
Individuals have a preference to shape the world in light of their preferences 
and beliefs. There is an innate desire for people to influence their surroundings. 
From the perspective of judges, it means retaining as much capacity as 
possible to impose their views on cases before them. This desire is 
understandable but should not be accommodated in a system governed by rules 
instead of by men and women.331 
It is for this reason that sentencing outcomes should be guided by clear, 
transparent, and prescriptive rules. This is best achieved by a fixed penalty 
regime. 
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C. Fixed Penalties Are Not Necessarily Too Severe 
The most common criticism of fixed penalties is that they are too severe. 
As noted above, fixed penalties are invariably introduced as part of a tough-on-
crime agenda,332 and thus it is not surprising that such an objection would be 
forthcoming.333 The harshness of fixed penalty systems has resulted in several 
law reform bodies, and the like, coming down firmly against introducing fixed 
penalties.334 
The criticism that fixed penalties are too severe has been advanced in 
several different ways. While these are normally put forward as discrete 
reasons for rejecting fixed penalties, in effect they are no more than an 
elucidation of the undesirable consequences that follow when unduly harsh 
criminal sanctions (fixed or not) are imposed. We now examine the supposed 
negative unintended consequences of fixed penalties. 
Research regarding trial rates in the United States federal jurisdiction 
shows that in response to the severe Federal Sentencing Guidelines more 
offenders pleaded guilty and the acquittal rate in relation to fixed penalty 
matters was lower.335 This is consistent with evidence that juries in England in 
the eighteenth century would refuse to convict offenders who were “guilty” of 
offenses carrying a mandatory death penalty.336 
More trials and incongruous jury verdicts are no doubt undesirable, but 
they are not unavoidable side effects of fixed sentences. The reason that 
offenders may be disposed to more strenuously resist offenses that carry 
mandatory sanctions and juries may try harder to acquit the accused charged 
with such offenses is that the stakes are high—and indeed too high. If fixed 
penalties were set at more moderate levels, the motivation for both of these 
side effects would dissipate.337 
Another objection to fixed penalties is that they lead to surreptitious 
avoidance tactics by criminal justice officials. There is evidence that in 
jurisdictions where harsh fixed penalties apply, police, prosecutors, and judges 
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devise innovative ways to avoid the operation of such laws.338 For example, it 
has been established that some prosecutors in the United States circumvent the 
application of severe mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines by charging offenders with different, but roughly 
similar, offenses that are not subject to mandatory penalties.339 Where 
offenders are charged under these provisions, judges sometimes side-step the 
mandatory minimums by techniques such as refusing to find facts (such as the 
use of a firearm), which would trigger their operation; or simply not invoking 
the applicable penalties on the assumption that neither of the parties will 
appeal the sentence.340 There is also evidence that prosecutors use mandatory 
provisions in order to exert pressure on the accused to plead guilty to similar 
offenses to those charged but which do not carry a mandatory sentence.341 As a 
result, there is a significant shift in discretion from judges to prosecutors.342 
Again, these problems are no more than a rehash of the more fundamental 
objection that some fixed penalties are too tough. If the legislature does set 
excessively high penalties and gets it about right in terms of equating the level 
of the penalty to the seriousness of the offense, prosecutors could not use the 
threat of mandatory penalties as a weapon to coerce guilty pleas, and it is 
unlikely that criminal justice officials would seek to circumvent the operation 
of such laws—there would be no reason to do so. 
Thus the criticism that fixed penalties are too tough and lead to undesirable 
side effects can be answered if more lenient fixed penalties are set. However, 
setting lower penalties simply in order to avoid the undesirable consequences, 
which flow from harsh fixed penalties, is not appropriate. The harm caused to 
the community by letting criminals off too lightly may outweigh any benefits 
flowing from improvements in the efficiency and consistency of the sentencing 
system. “Softer” penalties should only be fixed if they are justifiable on the 
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basis of more general criteria. As noted in Part VI, this in fact follows from 
application of the principle of proportionality.343 
D. Fixed Penalties Can Accommodate Validated Mitigating and Aggravating 
Factors 
The other main criticism of fixed penalties is that they are not sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the full ambit of relevant sentencing variables, and, as 
a result, different cases are not treated differently. This violates what Tonry 
believes is the paramount objective of sentencing: fairness. Fixed sentences, he 
believes, are well equipped to achieve one aspect of the fairness equation: 
treating like cases alike; but are unable to adequately deal with the other limb: 
treating different cases differently.344 In a similar vein, the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission rejected fixed penalties partly because it believed 
they provide limited opportunity for addressing the subjective features of the 
offender or the offense hence leading to injustice.345 
This criticism is not insurmountable. It can be met by identifying all 
possible justifiable fixed penalties and ascribing a pre-determined weight to 
each of them. To ascertain which considerations are properly relevant to the 
determination of how much to punish, it is necessary to develop and apply a 
coherent theory of mitigation and aggravation. One of us has undertaken this 
recently:346 
[C]onsiderations which lower a penalty can be divided into four categories: the 
circumstances of the offense; the offender’s response to a charge; matters 
personal to the offender; and the impact of the sanction on the offender and his 
or her dependants. As far as factors that increase penalty, the categories are: 
the offender’s criminal history; the manner in which the offense was 
committed; the nature of the victim; and the outcome of the offense.347 
  While that is the conventional manner in which aggravating and mitigating 
considerations are categorised, it stems from a desire for expediency rather 
than an approach derived from conceptual interrogation. The existing 
classifications provide a neat and orderly methodology for lawyers and judges 
who need to identify and catalogue established aggravating and mitigating 
considerations; however, they do not give any insight into the possible 
rationale and foundation for the considerations.348 
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  The more illuminating pathway to explaining and justifying aggravating 
and mitigating considerations is to place them in the multi-dimensional 
institutional construct within which they operate. In terms of the increasing 
breadth of operation, there are three such institutions. The first is the 
sentencing system. This system does not exist in a vacuum and is subsumed 
within the broader system of criminal justice and the over-arching system of 
law and justice. Hence, the second perspective is the criminal justice system, 
and the third is the legal system in general. As we shall see, the objectives of 
these systems are not always identical.349 
  The starting point in grounding aggravating and mitigating considerations 
is that they should be abolished unless a cogent justification is given in light of 
the objectives of these three institutions. [We] commence this inquiry by 
focusing on the sentencing system.350 
From this perspective a consideration should only operate to increase or 
decrease penalty if it promotes a sentencing objective which itself is 
justified.351 
As we have seen: 
[C]urrent empirical evidence provides no basis for confidence that sentencing 
is capable of achieving most of the goals of sentencing [in the form of specific 
deterrence, marginal general deterrence, and rehabilitation] and hence they 
should not drive the selection of aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
The one exception to this is the incapacitation of serious sexual and violent 
offenders.352 
Thus, from the perspective of the aims of the sentencing system, very few 
considerations should increase or decrease penalty. The objective of absolute 
deterrence is satisfied merely be ensuring that the penalty invoked is 
something that offenders would seek to avoid, that is, they find it unpleasant. It 
does not have to be particularly harsh. It is satisfied by a prison term—long or 
short—or, for that matter, probation or a non-trivial fine.353 
Incapacitation serves to justify a prison term for serious sexual and violent 
offenders. Moreover, as noted earlier, recidivist offenders who commit serious 
violent or sexual offenses should receive a penalty loading, albeit one that is 
lighter than is currently the situation. The premium that should be imposed for 
these types of offenses on recidivists is twenty to fifty percent.354 Also, first 
time offenders (for all forms of offenses) are less likely to recidivate than 
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repeat offenders. This justifies mitigation being accorded to offenders without 
a prior history. 
An especially controversial issue relating to mitigating factors is the extent 
to which the character and past deeds of an offender (beyond merely their past 
criminal history) should impact the sentence. Past positive contributions should 
not mitigate criminal sanctions because they do not bear on the objectives of 
the sentencing system. There is no evidence that charity workers, for example, 
recidivate less frequently than other offenders. Further, there are no wider 
principles of law and justice that support punishing offenders who have 
committed commendable acts less harshly. In a market-based system, many 
good acts are rewarded financially, and, where there is no financial benefit, 
people often receive non-tangible rewards in the form of feelings of 
satisfaction and accomplishment. Thus, to confer a sentencing discount for past 
acts would be to ‘double-dip’ when it comes to acknowledging such behavior. 
Thus, no good acts should mitigate penalty. 
  The above analysis supports a very limited number of aggravating or 
mitigating factors. Intuitively, this runs counter to entrenched sentencing 
methodology where many variations in the manner in which a crime is 
committed and the consequence of a crime can be important aggravating 
considerations. One seemingly novel conclusion stemming from the above 
analysis is that it runs counter to the view that premeditated criminal acts and 
those which cause grave harm to victims should be treated more harshly than 
substantive offenses of the same nature which are committed spontaneously 
and cause little harm to a victim. Moreover, offenders who are solely 
responsible for a criminal act or who have a key role in an offense are 
currently treated more severely than those who have a minor role. However, 
this discord does not, in fact, follow from [our] approach. Rather, these 
principles are accommodated within a different sentencing layer: 
proportionality, as opposed to the objectives of sentencing.355 
  Unlike the objectives of sentencing considered thus far, proportionalism is 
concerned with how much to punish as opposed to the logically prior issue of 
why we should punish. The content of the proportionality principle means, 
logically, that several mitigating and aggravating considerations are embedded 
within its construct.356 
While, as we have seen, the content of the proportionality principle is not 
firmly established: 
[I]t is clear that a cardinal criterion is the extent to which it sets back the 
interests and flourishing of victims. Accordingly, homicide offenses are the 
most serious. Offenses causing considerable degrees of permanent 
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impairment—whether physical or mental—also rate highly, as do sexual 
offenses. Culpability is also an entrenched aspect of this limb of the 
proportionality thesis.357 
  Thus, it follows that considerations that relate to culpability are capable of 
aggravating or mitigating penalty. For this reason, planned offenses are more 
serious than those committed spontaneously, and offenders who have a central 
role in a crime are more blameworthy than peripheral players.358 
  Further, the impact of the crime on victims and the effect of the sanction 
on offenders should also impact the penalty. Acts by offenders which reduce 
the level of the harm stemming from the offense should be mitigatory. This 
consideration applies most acutely in relation to property offenses because the 
value of the loss can be measured precisely (apart from where the property has 
sentimental value). It is manifest that a victim who has $10,000 stolen from 
him or her which is returned by the offender suffers less than a victim of a 
$10,000 theft who receives no restitution.359 
  On the other side of the proportionality equation, the same reasoning 
applies. The main criterion regarding penalty severity is the extent to which the 
penalty sets back the interests and flourishing of offenders. Prison is damaging 
because human beings have an innate desire for freedom and the capacity to 
shape their activities and lives according to their preferences. Moreover, 
certain prison conditions are considerably harsher than those typically 
designated by this type of sanction. The harshest prison conditions are those 
found in super-maximum prisons.360 
Offenders who are subjected to this form of punishment for reasons not of their 
doing, should receive a shortened prison term. 
  Having ascertained the mitigating and aggravating factors that stem from 
the objectives of sentencing and proportionalism, it is necessary to widen the 
examination to determine whether the substantive criminal law underpins any 
such considerations. Ostensibly, the answer is no. The substantive criminal law 
demarcates the distinction between behavior that is a crime and that which 
attracts no criminal liability. This distinction is done by setting out the nature 
of criminal acts, each of which is separated into distinct elements, and defining 
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defenses to those acts. Each criminal act has a maximum penalty, and, as we 
saw [earlier] often a presumptive penalty.361 
  The objectives of the substantive criminal law are reflected in the 
designation of the type of behavior which is categorized as a crime and the 
parameters as defined by the elements of the offense. Complex policy 
decisions inform the decisions regarding which type of behavior to criminalize. 
All western nations, with varying degrees of specificity, proscribe conduct that 
involves deliberate infringements on the right to life, bodily integrity, sexual 
autonomy, liberty and property. Criminalization often extends well beyond 
these parameters to include behavior such as drug use and road traffic 
compliance. Once these decisions have been made, there seems to be no 
further scope for the elements of the crime to influence sentence, beyond the 
sentence that has already been designated for the offense.362 
  Thus, it might appear that a premeditated murder is more serious than a 
spur-of-the-moment killing, and a $100,000 theft is worse than a theft of $10; 
however, if these differences are meaningful, they should presumably be 
reflected either in the different substantive classification of the offenses or 
maximum or presumptive penalties. In fact, this often is the case. . . . Once 
these parameters are set and accommodated, the impact of the substantive 
criminal law on sentencing is arguably exhausted.363 
  However, on closer reflection, an area of substantive criminal law which 
can influence mitigating and aggravating considerations is criminal defenses. 
In general, the substantive criminal law draws strict lines relating to the 
applicability of defenses. All criminal law systems have narrow and often 
technical defenses to crime. They are often based on general over-arching 
excuses and justifications which are recognized in some form by most western 
criminal justice systems. The key excuses which can exculpate otherwise 
criminal conduct are self-defense, duress or coercion, necessity and insanity. 
The criteria for legal excuses are necessarily narrow due to the binary nature of 
criminal law, that is, offenders are either guilty or innocent and, if the latter, 
they are beyond the bounds of legal censure or punishment. Sentencing, on the 
other hand, is not so clear-cut and there is potential scope for degrees of blame 
and wrongdoing which can be accommodated by adjusting the level of 
punishment.364 
  Thus, circumstances that are similar to those which could attract a legal 
defense, but fall short of constituting a criminal defense should potentially, at 
least, constitute mitigating considerations. This approach has the additional 
advantage of injecting a degree of coherency and consistency throughout the 
criminal law system. All of the defenses have discrete elements that need to be 
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satisfied in order to excuse what is otherwise criminal behavior. The exact 
content of these defenses varies slightly across jurisdictions. However, the 
justification and rationale for the defenses are universal.365 
  Failed criminal defenses have a link to exculpatory criminal behavior and, 
hence, should logically attract mitigation. However, if they are to operate in 
this way, their impact should be minor given that the substantive law has 
determined that they fall short of meeting the elements of the defense. In 
mathematical terms, such considerations warrant no more than, say, a ten 
percent discount.366 
  Intoxication is also a defense to crime in limited situations and, hence, can 
potentially operate as a mitigating factor when the extent of intoxication is not 
sufficient to constitute a defense. However, on balance, it should not operate in 
this manner. The conceptual basis for intoxication operating as a defense is 
disputable and there is a clear link between intoxication and crime. In 
particular, a large amount of violence is alcohol-fuelled. The link between 
alcohol and crime is well-known and it is foreseeable to most people that 
consumption of alcohol may increase the likelihood of engaging in crime. 
There is in fact a powerful argument for making intoxication an aggravating 
factor . . . . Thus, it follows that alcohol consumption should not reduce 
penalties.367 
  Similar considerations apply in relation to provocation which is a defense 
in some jurisdictions. Once again, the doctrinal underpinnings of the defense 
are dubious. The main flaw in provocation as a defense is that it assumes that 
people who lash out because of a loss of self-control are assumed to be less 
blameworthy than those who harm others for other reasons. This presumption 
assumes that anger is an emotion that should be accommodated by the law. 
This rationale is flawed for two key reasons. First, anger should not be 
rewarded more than other demonstrably less objectionable emotions. As noted 
by Arenson et al.: 
[T]here is no reason in logic or principle for allowing anger alone to serve 
as an excuse. As noted by J. Horder, 
why do we regard anger as an excusing condition but not killings 
motivated by spite, greed, and lust? Or, for that matter, if the current 
defense of provocation is used as a benchmark for the development of 
legal principle, why do we not allow emotions that are palpably 
desirable to be similarly excusatory when they manifest an intention to 
kill? Is it justifiable that a person who kills another out of love and 
kindness in a euthanasia scenario should be guilty of murder, yet an 
 
 365. Id. at 1224–25. 
 366. Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing, supra note 99, 
at 1225. 
 367. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] SAVING THE UNITED STATES FROM LURCHING 233 
accused who kills in anger should be convicted of the lesser crime of 
voluntary manslaughter?368 
  The other flaw with the provocation defense is that it relies on the 
assumption that anger should exculpate crime because it is unavoidable. Thus, 
provocation is viewed as a concession to the frailty of human nature369 The 
view that anger is a natural human feeling that reduces self-control, making 
law-abiding behavior more difficult, is flawed. It has been noted that humans 
have a far greater capacity to control emotions than is suggested by the 
provocation defense.370 
  Anger is an undesirable and damaging emotion. It is not a mindset that 
should be accommodated by the law. Individuals need to take responsibility for 
their conduct. Any legal principle that departs from this premise on the basis of 
speculation (i.e., people cannot control their emotions) is flawed and should be 
abolished and, hence, provocation should not be a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.371 
  While intoxication—and, in some cases, provocation—is a recognized 
defense that should not be a mitigating consideration, there is one 
consideration in which the reverse applies, in that it cannot provide a defense 
to a criminal act but should be a mitigating factor. Several theorists have 
argued that poverty should exculpate crime in some circumstances. While this 
idea has not influenced the operation of the substantive criminal law, 
[however], it is clear that wealth confers choice and opportunity, while poverty 
is restrictive and often leads to frustration and resentment. Rich people who 
commit crime are, arguably, more blameworthy than the poor who engage in 
the same conduct because the capacity of the rich to do otherwise is greater. 
Yet, it has been argued that we cannot allow poverty to mitigate criminal 
punishment. Otherwise, we potentially license or encourage people to commit 
crime. There is considerable force in this latter perspective. There is a non-
reducible baseline standard of conduct that is expected of all individuals, no 
matter how poor. It is never tolerable to inflict serious bodily or sexual injury 
on another person. Deprived background should not mitigate such crimes. 
However, a stronger argument can be made in favor of economic deprivation 
mitigating other forms of offenses, such as drug and property crimes. In 
relation to these offenses, the impact on victims is generally less severe and 
hence, the burden of poverty is the more compelling consideration. It should be 
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reflected in a discount for impoverished non-violent and non-sexual 
offenses.372 
  The third point of reference that affects the choice of aggravating and 
mitigating considerations is the legal system as a whole. Most of the objectives 
of the legal system in general are too broad to drive any particular sentencing 
considerations. At the broadest level, the objectives of the legal system involve 
the need to co-ordinate, control and regulate human behavior by establishing 
binding norms that comply with the cardinal rule of law virtues in the form of 
clarity, certainty and fairness.373 
  However, there are some particular pragmatic and doctrinal aspects of the 
legal system which are capable of directing sentencing law and practice. The 
main consideration of this nature is the need for efficiency in the disposition of 
criminal matters. Justice should be swift. Accordingly, the state has an interest 
in reducing the delay between the time of charge, verdict and sentence. There 
is also a preference to minimize the cost of the legal system. Hence, measures 
should be put in place to reduce the number of criminal trials. Offenders who 
plead guilty are less of a financial burden on the community than those who 
contest matters, and a guilty plea generally finalizes such matters faster.374 
  Thus, a strong argument can be mounted for according a discount to 
offenders who plead guilty.375 
  Absent the guilty plea discount, there is no incentive for accused persons to 
plead guilty, no matter how compelling the case against them.376 
  Another aim of the law is to encourage legal observance and achieve 
effective enforcement when the law is violated. Thus, a key aim of the legal 
system is to reduce crime and make offenders accountable for their crimes. . . . 
Thus, as a matter of public policy, the law should encourage those involved in 
criminal behavior to betray the confidence reposed in each other by providing 
a significant discount at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice system. 
This is especially apposite given that it often places the offender in personal 
danger.377 
It follows that the discount for cooperating with authorities should be 
considerable given its importance to the legal system as a whole. 
  An even more wide-ranging objective of criminal justice is that the 
innocent should not be punished. Accordingly, the impact of the penalty 
visited on others is a relevant consideration. The impact of a sentence on 
individuals other than the offender comes in degrees. Nearly every individual 
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is socially connected. However, some people are cardinal to the flourishing of 
others. Offenders are sometimes the financial, social, and emotional 
cornerstones to the lives of other individuals. Their confinement could have a 
devastating impact on those closely associated to them; typically, their children 
or spouse.378 
This hardship should be acknowledged in the form of a reduced sentence. 
[Thus,] considerations should only aggravate or mitigate sentence if they are 
justified by reference to one of four broader objectives, namely: (i) the 
sentencing system; (ii) the proportionality principle; (iii) the criminal justice 
system; or (iv) the wider well-established principles of justice.379 
Pursuant to the discussion above, there are seventeen considerations that 
aggravate or mitigate penalty.380 They are set out in tabulated form below with 
the amount of weight they should respectively carry. 
VI.  THE MODEL SENTENCING SYSTEM 
In light of the above discussion, we are now in a position to set out a model 
sentencing system. The starting point to a model sentencing system is to 
determine which factors are relevant to sentencing. As we saw earlier, the level 
at which criminal sanctions should be set is governed by the principle of 
proportionality. In addition to this, all relevant aggravating and mitigating 
considerations need to be incorporated. 
Due to the broadness with which most criminal offenses are defined,381 
offenses should be fragmented in order to distinguish more and less serious 
instances of the same offense and treat them accordingly. Thus, for example, a 
household burglary should carry a greater penalty than a burglary of 
commercial premises, and a theft of property valued in excess of $10,000 
should be treated more harshly than a theft of a lower amount. 
In essence, the fixed penalty system should be structured along the lines of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to the extent that offenses are 
compartmentalized into more and less serious instances of each type of 
offense. However, three significant departures should be made from this 
system. First, the penalty levels should be generally reduced. Secondly, far less 
weight should be accorded to an offender’s criminal history. Thirdly, there 
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should only be seventeen aggravating and mitigating factors (instead of the 
forty that currently are recognized). 
The ultimate upshot of our sentencing model is that the core variables in 
sentencing should be reduced to the following considerations: 
 There should be twenty-two penalty levels: starting at zero to six 
months’ imprisonment with the next level increasing to twelve months. 
 Each penalty level should then reflect an increase of twelve months. 
Thus, level twenty-one would equal twenty years’ imprisonment. The 
next and highest level should be life imprisonment. 
 Each crime should have a standard penalty. This is determined by the 
extent to which the typical form of that crime sets back the flourishing 
of the typical victim. 
 The only departures from this should arise from the list of seventeen 
aggravating and mitigating considerations set out above. 
In order to determine any particular sentence, there are only four 
considerations that a judge needs to evaluate. 
The first is the fixed penalty for the offense. The fixed level for every 
offense should be set out by reference to penalty level, which are as follows. 
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A. The First Reference Point: The Penalty Level 
Penalty level Duration of term of imprisonment 
1 0-6 months 
2 One year 
3 Two years 
4 Three years 
5 Four years 
6 Five years 
7 Six years 
8 Seven years 
9 Eight years 
10 Nine years 
11 Ten years 
12 Eleven years 
13 Twelve years 
14 Thirteen years 
15 Fourteen years 
16 Fifteen years 
17 Sixteen years 
18 Seventeen years 
19 Eighteen years 
20 Nineteen years 
21 Twenty years 
22 Life imprisonment 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
238 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:169 
Offenses that do not entail an imprisonment penalty will have a rating of 
zero. This means that the judge is restricted to imposing a lesser type of 
sanction, such as probation or a fine. The quantum of these sanctions should 
also be set by reference to maximum levels.382 
B. The Second Reference Point: The Standard Penalties for Certain Crimes 
The next consideration for a judge is to ascertain the fixed penalty level for 
the relevant offense. There are more than a thousand offenses or variants of an 
offense. The table below provides examples of the fixed penalty for twelve 
well-known offenses and contrasts the penalty with the current penalty in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
Offense Penalty level 
Theft 0383 
Theft of more than $10,000 1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)384 
Insider trading 1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)385 
Trafficking small quantities of drugs 
(e.g. less than 50 grams cocaine) 
1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)386 
Burglary of a residence 1 (0-6 months’ imprisonment)387 
Robbery 
(without the use of a weapon) 
2 (1 years’ imprisonment)388 
Robbery with a weapon 3 (2 years’ imprisonment)389 
 
 382. These levels are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Aggravated assault 6 (5 years’ imprisonment)390 
Trafficking large quantities of drugs 
(e.g. more than 450kg of cocaine) 
6 (5 years’ imprisonment)391 
 
Kidnapping with ransom demand 8 (7 years’ imprisonment) 392 
Criminal sexual abuse (i.e. rape) 11 (10 years’ imprisonment)393 
First degree murder 21 (20 years’ imprisonment)394 
C. The Third Reference Point: Aggravating and Mitigating Considerations 
The third step is to identify the aggravating and mitigating considerations. 
These are confined to the seventeen considerations below. 
AGGRAVATING CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Consideration 
Maximum 
Weight 
 
Rationale 
Prior criminal record for serious 
sexual and violent offenses 
50% 
 
Incapacitation 
High degree of involvement in 
crime 
10% Proportionality 
(culpability) 
High degree of planning 10% Proportionality 
(culpability) 
High level of harm 10% Proportionality  
(harm to victim) 
 
 389. Cf. Id. (contrasting this as a level twenty-three to twenty-seven offense, which carries a 
penalty range of 46–162 months’ imprisonment). 
 390. Cf. Id. at 53, 588 (contrasting this as a level fourteen to twenty-four offense, which 
carries a penalty range of 15–125 months’ imprisonment). 
 391. Cf. Id. at 145, 588 (contrasting this as a level thirty-eight offense, which carries a penalty 
range of 235 months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment). 
 392. Cf. Id. at 70, 588 (contrasting this as a level thirty-two to thirty-eight offense, which 
carries a penalty range of 125 months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment). 
 393. Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2014), supra note 383, at 57, 588 
(contrasting this as a level thirty to thirty-eight offense, which carries a penalty range ninety-
seven months’ imprisonment to life imprisonment). 
 394. Cf. Id. at 48, 588 (contrasting this as a level forty-three offense, which carries a penalty 
of life imprisonment). 
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MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Consideration 
Maximum 
Weight 
 
Rationale 
Severe impact from punishment 
(e.g. harsh prison conditions) 
50% Proportionality 
(harm to offender) 
Plea of guilty 25% Reduce delay and cost of 
criminal justice system 
Assisting authorities 25% Reduce crime 
Socioeconomic deprivation—only 
for nonsexual and nonviolent 
offenses 
25% Proportionality 
(culpability) 
Restitution of property 25% Proportionality 
(harm to victim) 
No prior convictions 25% Incapacitation 
Harm to dependents of the 
offender 
20% Innocent should not suffer 
Incidental punishment 20% Proportionality 
(harm to offender) 
Spontaneous offending 10% Proportionality 
(culpability) 
Self-defense 10% Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal law) 
Necessity 10% Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal law) 
Duress or coercion 10% Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal law) 
Mental illness 10% Failed criminal defense 
(coherency of the criminal law) 
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D. The Fourth Reference Point: The Calibration (The Exact Sentence) 
In terms of calibrating the penalty, the standard penalty needs to be 
moderated by reference to the applicability of any relevant aggravating and 
mitigating considerations. These factors do not operate in a simple cumulative 
manner, otherwise, a combination of mitigating factors could potentially 
amount to a discount of 100% or more. Instead, the discounts or additions are 
to be applied individually, to the contracted or elevated sentence, following 
application of the previous consideration. Thus, pleading guilty and assisting 
authorities does not lead to a fifty percent discount of the entire sentence. 
Rather, the discount is forty-three percent (i.e. twenty-five percent plus 
seventy-five percent, the remaining part of the sentence, multiplied by twenty-
five percent). Once the calibration of the aggravating and mitigating factors is 
ascertained, these are then operationalized against each other to produce a clear 
figure. Thus, if, for example, the aggravating factors arrive at thirty percent 
and the mitigating factors are fifty percent, the sentence should be reduced by 
twenty percent from the standard penalty. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The sentencing system is broken. This is no surprise to any person with 
even a cursory knowledge of the manner in which the system operates and the 
limits of the state-operated system in actually attaining key sentencing 
objectives. The gulf between sentencing practice and actual knowledge is 
considerable. The refusal or failure of government to base sentencing practice 
on sentencing information is the key reason for the current incarceration crisis. 
The crisis has continued unabated because the government was not required to 
critically examine the shortcomings of the system because criminals do not 
engender meaningful empathy within the community. 
The runaway train that is overly harsh penalties has finally turned full 
circle to crash into the institution, which set it in on its ruinous journey. 
Governments can no longer bear the crippling cost of mass incarceration. 
Yet there is no indication that the response to the crisis will put in place a 
durable, efficient, and fair solution. This Article attempts to remedy this 
shortcoming. Sentencing is too important to continue getting wrong. It is the 
process in which the state acts in its most coercive manner against its citizens. 
This not only potentially damages individual citizens but, as is now manifest, 
also the wider community. 
The Article suggests that the key to improving the sentencing systems rests 
in implementing proportionate sentences. This is a view shared by others, 
including the United States National Research Council and the United 
Sentencing Commission, which too endorse the proportionality principle. The 
difference in our position is that we believe that proportionality in its current 
form is an illusion. It is devoid of coherent content and this is partly the reason 
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for its theoretical universal endorsement. No one has an interest in debunking a 
principle, which is so malleable that it can be used to justify virtually any 
sentencing stance. In reality, a principle, which stands for nothing, is no 
principle at all: it is an expedient. And that is the current state of knowledge 
regarding proportionality. This Article seeks to develop it from an expedient to 
a principle. 
We have provided a tentative account of the current state of learning 
regarding the content of proportionality and the implications from this so far as 
sentencing outcomes are concerned. We have also indicated the areas where 
future research is necessary. This approach entails a vastly different sentencing 
paradigm: one which is best pursued through a fixed penalty system. 
All of the supposed shortcomings of fixed penalties can be overcome by 
setting penalty ranges at proportionate levels. The benefit of fixed penalties is 
that they will serve to maintain transparency, consistency, and predictability in 
sentencing. There will be no curtailment of the need for individualized justice 
given that pursuant to our model all relevant mitigating and aggravating factors 
can be readily factored into any penalty calibration. 
Implementation of our proposal will significantly lower prison numbers, 
reduce racial disparity in sentencing, make the community no less safe, and 
inject normative and doctrinal coherency into the sentencing system, while 
retaining transparency and consistency. In short, prisons will be reserved for 
those whom have damaged us and whom we have reason to fear: serious 
violent and sexual offenders. We may still dislike and even hate other 
offenders, such as drug distributors, fraudsters, and immigration offenders, but 
(in normal circumstances) that dislike will no longer operate to unjustifiably 
damage them and harm us in the form of public expenditure we cannot readily 
afford. 
Moreover, this Article has set out in concrete terms the penalties that 
should be operated for key offenses and the exact mechanism by which key 
sentencing considerations should be incorporated into the sentencing calculus. 
The approach varies markedly from existing fixed penalty systems, but at the 
minimum we hope that the framework will form the foundation for a genuinely 
more enlightened age in sentencing. 
 
